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The segmentation of knowledge, with its splintered approach to truth
and consequent fragmentation of meaning, keeps people
today from coming to an interior unity.
Pope John Paul II1.
Yet the response to fragmentation is reunification, and as I have argued,
contemporary virtue theory, with one leg firmly rooted in classical
philosophy and the other in pragmatic naturalism, provides
a most powerful and promising resource to fuel that endeavor.
Guy Axtell2.
Pope John Paul II is not alone in his call for «a unified and organic
vision of knowledge»3 as a means of promoting authentic human develop-
ment in the truth. Is a return to the intellectual virtues and faculties the so-
lution?
Fides et Ratio is a response to the soul-destroying relativism of
many total hermeneutic and neo-positivist philosophies4. Deep seated
truths that can be found in all cultures, in any age, about who we are and
why we are here, need to be recognised and fostered, rather than simply in-
terpreted as grammatical quirks or emotional desires that have been articu-
lated by the imagination. Nor can the human being be reduced to his or her
genetic make-up and studied entirely according to the empirical method of
the natural sciences. Where quark B will serve equally well as quark A in a
1. JOHN PAUL II, Fides et ratio. On the Relationship between Faith and Reason [on-
line]. Available: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/encyclicals/docu-
ments/hf_jp_ii_enc_15101998_fides-et-ratio_en.htm [1998, Sept 14] (last checked:
2002, Jan 29), no. 85.
2. G. AXTELL, «The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of Episte-
mology», The Monist, 81 (1997) 507 (in advance: RIV).
3. Cfr. JOHN PAUL II, Fides et ratio, n. 82.
4. Cfr. ibid, nn. 85, 96.
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physics experiment, Queen Elizabeth the Second could not be so easily
substituted for by Atilla the Hun in a historical survey of the monarchy.
The difference between them is one of character. In effect, individual cha-
racter distinguishes the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) from the
humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) according to the way in which each
one freely forges their own personality. Even Popper acknowledges the
role of creativity and interpretation at each stage of the scientific method:
in the formulation of new hypotheses, in the formulation and reception of
empirical statements that serve to verify (falsify) those hypotheses, and in
the evaluation of the hypotheses in the light of the available evidence5.
Is there some rational principle according to which our personally
acquired habits of character and thought in research (and life in general)
should be guided? Or are our life practices (Lebensformen) their own justi-
fication?6.
Everyday experience, not only of our own existence, but also of the
finitude of that existence as we know it, pushes us towards some sure foun-
dation from which to guide our lives. And all truth, however partial, if it is
really true, presents itself as universal. What is true should be true for
everybody, always7. As a result, men and women should be able to verify
their ability to reach knowledge of the truth via the adequatio rei et inte-
llectus of the Scholastics8. Modern concerns for justification should not be
disassociated then from the rational investigation procedures that lead to
truth. Such rationality is not something coldly scientific but is, rather, inti-
mately bound up with virtuous conduct. And the responsible agent is also a
veritatively reliable one. The truth is a «thick» concept, a transcendental,
that allows for ever deeper levels of understanding. Scientific demonstra-
tions do not provide us with the last word on meaning in human life. For
that reason the Roman Pontiff has made an appeal to all philosophers, and
especially to Christian ones, to promote a truly sapiential vision of life to
their sisters and brothers in the human race. A dimension that is all the
more necessary given the pace with which our technical power to trans-
form the human being himself advances9.
Coincidentally, a similar debate is under way in the specialist philo-
sophical journals of the United States regarding the possibility of a «Virtue
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5. M. ARTIGAS, La mente del universo, Eunsa, Pamplona 1999, p. 235. Cfr. E. MOROS,
«La filosofía analitica y la encíclica Fides et Ratio», Anuario Filosófico, 32 (1999) 707.
6. Cfr. ibid.
7. Cfr. JOHN PAUL II, Fides et Ratio, n. 27.
8. Cfr. ibid, n. 82. I would add that the Pope’s use of res in relation to the truth re-
flects a concern that real being, and not just rationalist veritative being, be the measure
for our judgements about the world (cfr., E. MOROS, «La filosofía analitica y la encíclica
Fides et Ratio», p. 722).
9. Cfr. JOHN PAUL II, Fides et Ratio, n. 81.
Epistemology». Virtue Epistemology says that the interior unity of the
epistemic agent is the key to the reunification of epistemology, and that the
virtues have a critical role to play in achieving interior unity. The intellec-
tual and moral habits that we form in our natural faculties provide us with
a real, and not artificially imagined, basis for a corresponding integration
of the different fields of knowledge into a hierarchy.
The current debate centres on Linda Zagzebski’s Virtues of the
Mind, a book that claims to have resolved the epistemic problems posed by
Edmund Gettier in 196310. According to Gettier, the traditional definition
of ‘knowledge’ as justified true belief is insufficient11. But Zagzebski has
successfully formulated criteria that justify our knowledge according to
Aristotelian notions of virtue12. Although she is not a Thomist, her own
thought follows that of St Thomas in many points and is of great interest to
Thomistic philosophy13. Indeed, Linda Zagzebski has been spearheading a
recovery of many Aristotelian doctrines in contemporary epistemology,
most notably the virtue of phronesis14. I think that Linda Zagzebski’s vir-
tue-based prescriptions can be given a firm ontological grounding in the
faculties of human nature.
The awakened interest of epistemologists in the Greek virtues is a
somewhat logical consequence of the popular interest that Virtue Ethics it-
self has spurred in the United States over the last thirty years15. The idea of
there being a parallel Virtue Epistemology was first touted by Ernest Sosa
in his «The Raft and the Pyramid»16. How might work in Virtue Ethics
apply to the normative problem of justification in epistemology? That is
the task that Linda Zagzebski has undertaken in her book Virtues of the
Mind 17.
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10. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the nature of Virtue and the
Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, p.
298 (in advance: VOM).
11. E. GETTIER, «Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?», Analysis, 23 (1963) 121-
123.
12. Cfr. E. MOROS, «La filosofía analitica y la encíclica Fides et Ratio», p. 722.
13. Cfr. T.S. HIBBS, Book Review of Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Natu-
re of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge [online]. Was available:
http://www.thomist.org/97BHibbs.htm [1997], p. 2.
14. Cfr., ibid.
15. Cfr. G. AXTELL, «Introduction», G. AXTELL (ed.), Knowledge, Belief, and Cha-
racter: Readings in Virtue Epistemology, Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland 2000, p.
xi. Also, [online]. Available: http://www.scsr. nevada.edu/~axtell/introduction.html
[2000], p. 1.
16. E. SOSA, «The Raft and the Pyramid: coherence versus foundations in the the-
ory of knowledge», E. SOSA (ed.), Knowledge in Perspective, Selected Essays in Episte-
mology, Cambridge University Press, New York 1991, pp. 189-190. Cfr., VOM, p. 4.
17. Cf., VOM, p. 2.
During Linda’s visit to the University of Navarre in the spring of
2000, I was fortunate to be able to discuss the current state of Virtue Epis-
temology at length with her. She told me that although the word «virtue» is
now being bandied about within epistemic circles, almost nobody has ac-
tually read all the literature behind the term. It would appear that many aut-
hors are using it as a «stop-gap» measure within a consequentialist or «act-
based» paradigm not suited to the virtues. I told her of the all the work
being carried out on the virtues in the Spanish language at the University
of Navarre, and that my intention was to draw from this rich reserve and
present it to an English speaking audience which is unfamiliar with Medi-
terranean philosophy (past and present). Linda assured me that the presen-
tation of Thomistic philosophy within the framework of contemporary
problems of knowledge would be at the epistemic cutting edge. This doc-
toral thesis looks to critique and continue the path-breaking work underta-
ken by Linda Zagzebski in the Anglo-American literature on the virtues
and rationality.
I am most grateful to Professors Linda Zagzebski, John Greco and
Guy Axtell for their time, prompt e-mail responses and helpful advice, for
the direction of my thesis supervisor Fr Enrique Moros as well as to Fr Er-
lito Maraya and Professor David Twetten for their incisive observations. I
would also like to thank Dr Lourdes Flamarique, Dr Juan Fernando Selles,
Professors Alejandro Llano, Jaime Nubiola and Fr Modesto Santos in the
Faculty of Philosophy in the University of Navarre whose work and tea-
ching of St Thomas Aquinas, Professors Leonardo Polo and Antonio Mi-
llán-Puelles form the kernel of my observations on the Virtue Epistemo-
logy debate. A last thank you goes out to the Ecclesiastical Department of
Philosophy in the University of Navarre.
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1. ZAGZEBSKI’S MOTIVATION-BASED VIRTUE THEORY
Zagzebski circumvents the Gettier problems associated with justi-
fied true belief by turning the focus of justification onto the method of in-
quiry rather than onto the belief itself1. Plantinga counselled a divorce bet-
ween the internalist and externalist features of the epistemic stalemate as a
possible way out, but virtue theory adds to our list of options in marriage
guidance. The paradigm of the virtues and vices provides us with the me-
ans for making a marriage work between the internal and external aspects
to epistemic justification. According to a virtue approach, a justified belief
would be derived from a virtue in the same way that a right act is said to
derive from the concept of a moral virtue.
Linda Zagzebski has looked to provide an account of virtue that is
theoretically strong, practically useful, and in agreement with the «pre-theo-
retical» notion of virtue gleaned from its usage throughout history down to
our own day2. Indeed, she is recognised as having provided the most com-
prehensive agent-based Virtue Epistemology to date3. Zagzebski has map-
ped out a first approach to what such a study might look like, and is well
aware that the motivation-based theory that she has put forward as the fruit
of her labours in the specification of moral and intellectual virtues will sound
novel and even unacceptable to many virtue theorists4. But that has not been
an impediment to her looking to try and develop virtue ethics in new ways:
1. A solution inspired by the virtue approach to moral arguments where an analo-
gous dispute rages between deontologists and consequentialists.
2. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the nature of Virtue and
the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996,
pp. 266-268 (in advance: VOM).
3. Cfr. G. AXTELL, «The Role of the Intellectual Virtues in the Reunification of
Epistemology», The Monist, 81 (1997) 492 (in advance: RIV).
4. Cfr. VOM, 74.
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«the question of which comes first, end or motive, is the point at issue bet-
ween a virtue theory that is happiness-based and an agent-based theory of
the form I have called motivation-based. The former has the advantage of
tradition; the latter has the advantage of novelty»5.
Although Zagzebski has provided us with a detailed account of
what a virtue-epistemology theory should look like, she believes that more
work will need to be done on the connections that exist between the inter-
nal and external aspects of intellectual virtue and of intellectually virtuous
acts6. On the empirical side of such a project, major advances in the history
of ideas like freedom and human rights, and in the history of inventions,
still await study by psychologists in order to determine what the intellectual
traits were that allowed for such gains in knowledge. On the analytical side
lie the fundamental questions of just what a good belief is, what it is that gi-
ves us understanding, and how we ought to go about finding the truth. But
this also means looking at what people actually do in these situations, espe-
cially at that subset of persons who are prudent (practically wise)7.
1.1. Dual Component Moral Virtues
Hilary Kornblith, in «Ever Since Descartes», proposed a reconcilia-
tion between the reliabilists’ concern for truth and the responsibilists’ con-
cern for personal effort via a recognition of the different levels of descriptive
and evaluative analysis that go into an epistemic evaluation8. He distin-
guished 3 simultaneous tiers of justification:
i. objective reliability in the belief arrived at and in the actions
performed.
ii. subjective coherence in the belief arrived at.
iii. subjective responsibility in the actions performed (regulated by
a desire for truth).
Linda Zagzebski attempts a solution of this sort by using the virtues
as the foundational paradigm for the mix of «responsibility in motive»
with «reliability in end». It is her belief that the normative component to
knowledge is epistemic virtue and that knowledge itself can be described
as true belief grounded in epistemic virtue9.
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5. Cfr. ibid., p. 338.
6. Cfr. ibid., p. 334.
7. Cfr. ibid., p. 337.
8. Cfr. H. KORNBLITH, «Ever since Descartes», The Monist, 68 (1985) 264-276.
9. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Religious Knowledge and the Virtues», L. ZAGZEBSKI (ed.),
Rational Faith: Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology, University of Notre
Dame Press, Notre Dame 1993, p. 209.
The virtues put us in a position to know and in a position to attune
ourselves to our environment (shades of Befindlichkeit), in a way that dod-
ges the irenic nature of the reliabilist’s consequentialism (who apply the
agent-based terminology of the virtues to what are basically belief-based
concepts). Where Sosa has combined Kornblith’s first two levels of objec-
tive reliability and subjective coherence, Zagzebski goes a step further in
also examining the responsibility of the agent for his «own-lights» subjec-
tive coherence. The agent may very well have a coherent set of beliefs, but
did she seek out possible evidence to the contrary or did she intentionally
prefer to remain in the dark? A responsibility constraint is needed in order
to render reliable belief formation, and Sosa’s inner coherence or Gold-
man’s «own standards», consistent with one another.
Zagzebski makes an original incursion into the field of virtue, then,
adopting a wholly agent-based approach where the goodness of a virtue
depends not upon some external object to be sought after, but rather upon
the intrinsic goodness of the motive by which one acts. The concern for re-
liability is also incorporated into this agent-based approach, where success
is defined in terms of achieving the aim of the motive. Zagzebski is keen to
explore its possibilities as a novel approach in the epistemic literature, yet
she says that it is not so far removed from the literature of the Stoics or of
Confucius himself10.
1.2. Intellectual Virtues as Moral Virtues
An intellectual virtue has traditionally been seen as a habit which
aids possession of the truth, whereas a moral virtue is concerned with the
pursuit of goodness. This Aristotelian split between objective reasoning
and our passions and will has tended to dominate the history of Western
thought11. The Greeks focused their attention on the intellectual side of the
division12, and the Christians chose to investigate the moral side instead in
their belief that «God is love»13. What, though, is the relationship between
the true and the good and the virtues that aid their attainment? At the dawn
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10. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «An Agent-Based Approach to the Problem of Evil», Inter-
national Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 39 (1996) 130. Also, VOM, p. 211, ft. 57.
11. Spinoza and Hume disagreed. Spinoza, because he made understanding the key
to all virtues —the mind considering as good only that which leads to understanding—
(cfr. ibid., p. 138). Hume, because he regarded the distinction as merely verbal, since
«virtue» is a question of praise and blame alone, and so also includes mere defects and
talents in his list of virtues and vices.
12. St Thomas Aquinas lamented the Greeks lack of attention to the will in his De
Veritate, c. 24, a. 4, r. 9, «Et ideo philosophi in voluntate non posuerunt aliquem habi-
tum nec naturalem nec acquisitum».
13. 1 John 4:16.
of the third millennium, the various branches of knowledge have spread so
far away from each other that it would seem that there is no real relations-
hip between truth and truth let alone between the true and the good14.
Everyday life shows us, however, that they do relate to each other: on the
one hand a good choice is generally agreed to be an informed choice, and
on the other hand a passion for truth, or at least finding something interes-
ting, can help one pay attention to what one is studying and so aid the ac-
quisition of knowledge. The problem of how the true and the good, and the
intellectual and moral virtues, relate to each other is complicated as there
are multiple points of contact. Does it lie at some metaphysical level with
the «transcendentals»? Or in the transcendental agent who possesses the
virtues? It is a knotty problem and it would seem that we have not yet done
enough philosophical contortions to unravel it.
Zagzebski takes sides with Montmarquet and states that the inte-
llectual virtues ought to be modelled according to Aristotle’s treatment of
the moral virtues.
«Intellectual virtues are a subset of moral virtues and justification
is not just a normative property; it is a moral one. [...] Intellectual virtues
do not differ from moral virtues in any important way. Both are acquired
by imitating virtuous persons and developing habits aimed at controlling
emotions and developing the cognitive and perceptual abilities necessary to
know how to apply the virtues in the appropriate circumstances»15.
The Aristotelian division of the soul into «thinking and feeling»
would appear to lead to an artificial division of the virtues into intellectual
and moral categories when in fact the intellectual virtues should really be
dealt with as a subset of the moral ones16. Zagzebski views Aristotle’s dis-
tinction as a functional one whereby «the thinking part commands, and the
feeling part obeys»17. A division followed by St Thomas who describes the
intellectual virtues as rational by nature and the moral ones as rational by
participation in the appetitive (appetitus – tend towards) part of the soul18.
Although Aristotle says that there is no necessary link between how
he has determined the potencies of the soul and his distinction of the vir-
tues, Zagzebski rejects that claim19. The Aristotelian distinction of the ha-
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14. Deleuze and other postmoderns compare knowledge to a series of entwined tu-
bular roots —emphasising the different, the particular, and the other, rather than to a
Cartesian tree of unity in the sciences—.
15. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Précis of Virtues of the Mind», Philosophical and Phenomeno-
logical Research, 60 (2000) 172-173.
16. Cfr. VOM, pp. 139-140.
17. Ibid., p. 143.
18. Cfr. ibid., p. 141.
19. Cfr. ibid., pp. 141-143.
bits is drawn from the distinction of the faculties, and the faculties are dis-
tinguished by their objects20. The intellectual and moral virtues are distin-
guished according to a division of the incarnated soul into logos and pat-
hos 21. Aristotle gives three basic justifications for this division:
1. The experience of conflict between choice and desire22. Aristotle
says that desires cannot conflict with each other23. But Zagzebski disagrees
and says that we could as easily continue a division of the soul on the basis
of conflicting desires24.
2. We feel pleasure and pain in the passions but not in the mind25.
But moral virtues (said to be associated with the passions) such as genero-
sity and kindness have little to do with pleasure and pain, nor does the fee-
ling that accompanies curiosity. On the other hand, the intellectual virtues
and vices are closely accompanied by pleasure or pain as when we finally
understand something or get confused. The moral virtues of justice, ho-
nesty, sincerity and trustworthiness have little to do with feeling, whereas
the passion for truth can be very strong indeed. Zagzebski feels that the as-
pect of «taming» has stood out in morals —the taming of the libido or of
fear for instance— but such taming of passion is just as necessary in the in-
tellectual sphere, against clinging to old beliefs or against egoism which
leads to hypocrisy and self-deception. As with the moral virtues, so too
with the intellectual ones, it would appear that error can fall on the side of
lack. Thirst for the truth can be every bit as wanting as benevolence and
kindness. And a pathological indecision due to continued weighing up of
argument and counter-argument can be matched by an opposite extreme of
drunken confidence where one is quite certain but not sure exactly of what.
And there are, moreover, states which blend feeling with thinking, as is the
case with curiosity, doubt, wonder and awe.
3. The intellectual virtues are taught but the moral virtues are ac-
quired by practice and imitation26. This does not seem to stand up to the
evidence. How is one to teach «open-mindedness, the ability to think up an
explanation for a complex set of data, or the ability to recognize reliable
authority»?27. Practical wisdom is as necessary here as with the moral vir-
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LINDA ZAGZEBSKI 273
20. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, II, 4, 415a14-21. From an abstract point of view
the objects of episteme and phronesis are sharply distinct. But in situ, in the habits them-
selves, the distinction begins to blur.
21. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, II, 1, 1220a5-13.
22. Cfr. VOM, p. 143.
23. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, III, 2, 1111b15-16.
24. Cfr. VOM, p. 143.
25. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, II, 2, 1220a36; ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Et-
hics, II, 5, 1105b21-23.
26. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1, 1103a14-20.
27. VOM, p. 150.
tues since no amount of rule-following is sufficient to tell us when to place
intellectual trust in the reliability of another. Who has acquired the inte-
llectual virtues wants to trust whom she knows she should trust and does
not want to trust the untrustworthy or unreliable.
What Aristotle seems to refer to as being taught would actually
qualify as intellectual skills and not as virtues. It is only through the imita-
tion of virtuous persons and training —passing through a stage of self-con-
trol against contrary inclinations (intellectual akrasia)— that one even-
tually acquires the habit of wanting to think well and enjoy the experience
of doing so. At the bottom end of the scale, for instance, we have the inte-
llectual vices of «intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, con-
formity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, close-minded-
ness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness»28. It is
likely, moreover, that for each intellectual virtue, there will be two corres-
ponding extremes (as mentioned just a little earlier). An intellectual extre-
me could even verge on the pathological e.g. indecision through over sen-
sitivity to detail versus the sheer conviction with which one sweats in
every pore of their body whilst under the influence, but without the least
idea of what it is he is convinced of.
Nobody starts off from a position of intellectual vice, but a higher
cognitive state than simple ignorance is that of intellectual akrasia when
one indulges in a form of self-deception preferring flattery or prejudice to
the truth. An akrasia that may involve an even greater amount of self-de-
ception in belief than with moral acts, due to the even stronger link betwe-
en believing and believing in a justified way, than with doing and belie-
ving in a justified way. After akrasia one looks to intellectual self-control.
One consciously stops oneself from falling into prejudiced judgement
about others. The behaviour of such a person is correct but it does not yet
possess the firm character of the virtues of «intellectual carefulness, perse-
verance, humility, vigor, flexibility, courage, and thoroughness, as well as
open-mindedness, fair-mindedness, insightfulness, and the virtues opposed
to wishful thinking, obtuseness, and conformity. One of the most impor-
tant virtues, I believe, is intellectual integrity»29. Integrity would appear to
be a higher order virtue, since one cannot be true to one’s moral self when
not so to one’s intellectual self. A hypocrite actually starts to believe in
what she, at first, had only said for cynical reasons. Her moral failing leads
to the intellectual failing of not knowing herself and so she suffers a psy-
chic split which is opposed to her integrity i.e. her unity of life30.
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28. Ibid., p. 152.
29. Ibid., p. 155.
30. Hypocrisy is different to akrasia where someone personally fails but counsels
otherwise.
What we are to deduce from the above arguments is that the inte-
llectual and moral virtues do not lead separate lives. Intellectual failings
result from moral vice —pride and egotism can lead one to seek to win an
argument rather than to pursue the truth—. Patience, perseverance, and
courage are necessary moral virtues for the intellectual ones hence. Other
virtues are both intellectual and moral such as prudence in knowing when
to be autonomous and when to trust31. And moral virtues like honesty call
for the possession of the (Zagzebskian) intellectual virtues because
«(an) honest person is careful with the truth. She respects it and does her
best to find it out, to preserve it, and to communicate it in a way that per-
mits the hearer to believe the truth justifiably and with understanding. [...]
She must be attentive, take the trouble to be thorough and careful in weig-
hing evidence, be intellectually and perceptually acute»32.
I would say that the root objection of Zagzebski to Aristotle’s divi-
sion of the intellectual from the moral virtues lies in the fact that what she
takes to be an intellectual virtue is what Aristotle would have recognised
as a moral virtue applied to the intellectual sphere. Let us take a list of
what she considers to be intellectual virtues:
«Intellectual virtues
• the ability to recognize the salient facts; sensitivity to detail
• open-mindedness in collecting and appraising evidence
• fairness in evaluating the arguments of others
• intellectual humility
• intellectual perseverance, diligence, care, and thoroughness
• adaptability of intellect
• the detective’s virtues: thinking of coherent explanations of the facts
• being able to recognize reliable authority
• insight into persons, problems, theories
• the teaching virtues: the social virtues of being communicative, inclu-
ding intellectual candor and knowing your audience and how they res-
pond»33.
Some of these virtues are clearly intellectual virtues i.e. the ability
to recognise the salient facts or think up coherent explanations or have in-
sight are examples of scientia and understanding, and the recognition of
reliable authority pertains to prudence or practical wisdom. But the rest of
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31. We trust someone not to damage something of value to us, just as we trust so-
meone to tell us the truth when they are in a position to lie.
32. VOM, pp. 158-159. Cfr. Naivety where intellectual failing seems to actually
cause moral goodness!
33. Ibid., p. 114.
the virtues indicated correspond to a more general moral virtue e.g. fair-
ness, humility, perseverance and diligence, adaptability (meekness) and re-
ceptivity. A more salient division of these two groups of virtues could be
made according to those habits that allow for the grasp of universal princi-
ples versus those habits that assist the carrying out of concrete actions.
Zagzebski objects, however, that the traditional division of the intellect
into its speculative and practical uses leaves «contingent knowledge» for
its own sake (and not for use) in limbo34. I think that she fails to capture the
essential difference, however, between the universal nature of our specula-
tive knowledge and the concrete and contingent nature of the particular re-
alities that we know35.
1.3. Motivations
The historical picture of virtue as a corrective force over our emo-
tions seems to paint emotion as a negative factor in our practical judge-
ment but it can be a spur to better judgement (attention, etc) if channelled
properly. The nexus between feeling and virtue would seem to lie in our
(emotional) motivations hence.
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34. Cfr. ibid., p. 214.
35. With regard to the necessity or contingency of our knowledge St Thomas
Aquinas says the following: «We have some cognitive potencies and habits in which
there can never be falsity, as, for example, with our senses, science, and intellection of
the principles; there are, on the other hand, others in which falsity is possible, as with
the imagination, opinion and estimation. Falsity is produced in someone’s knowledge
because something is learnt as being different to how it is in reality. [...] Once the con-
tingent actually exists, a judgement can be made by that potency or habit in which fal-
sity does not occur, as for example, the senses should judge that Socrates is sitting
down when he is seated. [...] then our sight does not err in seeing contingent beings
when they are present, and yet this does not impede their still being contingent them-
selves» (De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12, co). When we see something, we do not err in the fact
that we are seeing something, whatever it might actually be. Now, «It is one thing to at-
tribute something to an entity according to how it is in itself, but it is something quite
different to attribute something to that entity according to how it is known. What is at-
tributed to something in itself pertains to its way of being, but what is attributed to it or
in what follows from it, insofar as it is known, pertains to the way of knowing of the
knower» (De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12, ad. 7). In fact, in reply to the objection that God’s
knowledge must be variable because He knows variable things St Thomas responds
that «the assimilation of knowledge to the known thing is not realised in conformance
to the nature but rather according to the representation, for which it does not follow
that there is a variable knowledge of variable things» (De Veritate, q. 2, a. 13, ad. 1).
«the mode of knowing is in the selfsame knower but the thing known is not in the kno-
wer according to its nature, and so the variability in the modes of knowing will make a
science variable and not the change in the things known» (cfr. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 13,
ad. 8, my translations).
1.3.1. Intrinsic Worth vs. Eudaimonia
Aristotle’s supposedly flimsy justification for his «division» of the
soul is not Zagzebski’s only qualm with his happiness-based epistemo-
logy36. An additional difficulty with the teleological paradigm is that, follo-
wing Spinoza’s and Hume’s damnation of finality, it is a particularly unpa-
latable notion for most contemporary philosophers. Many contemporary
ethicists seem to have despaired in ever being able to give a clear and plau-
sible account of eudaimonia, and although it seems right that there must be
something common to all human beings which makes them human, the tra-
ditional concept of «nature» has really taken a battering as «outdated bio-
logy»37. Zagzebski does not rule out the possible success in epistemology
of an eudaimonia, or happiness-based virtue approach, in advance. Indeed
she takes her hat off to its long established tradition and its deeper me-
taphysical roots whereby the good and the true are founded in a «love of
being» (strange as such language may sound to the contemporary ear)38.
But the obstacles in its way seem to be daunting. In order to find customers
in the epistemic marketplace, a traditional virtue approach would need to
provide some hard-sell that personal happiness is both recognisable and
possible39.
A candidate alternative to Aristotle’s «agent-prior» or good-based
virtue theory can be found in an «agent-based» theory that makes the inner
trait of a virtue good in itself40.
«The type of theory I want to describe is a strong form of virtue et-
hics lately called “agent-based virtue ethics”. Like all virtue theories this
theory focuses its analysis on the inner traits of [a] person —their virtues
and vices, and on the components of virtues and vices, particularly motiva-
tions—. Virtue theories do not derive the concept of virtue from the con-
cept of a right act, either as a disposition to perform right acts, or by rela-
tion to right acts. [...] The motivations or behavior of virtuous persons is
what makes an act right. An act would not be right if it were not for its rela-
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36. Cfr. VOM, p. 140 & pp. 200-202 & p. 210. Zagzebski’s concern with the
«split» between the cognitive and feeling is that, although it runs counter to modern psy-
chology, it is even more pronounced today with the dominance of the computer model
and the associated imagery of human knowledge as a form of information processing
(we speak of having limited RAM when we feel overloaded with facts, etc., cfr. ibid., p.
257). Narrative literature on the human situation tends to avoid these kinds of splits gi-
ven that is more impartial from particular theories i.e. the didactic is not its aim.
37. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations of Ethics», Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers, 15 (1998) 538-539.
38. Cfr. VOM, pp. 198-199, 210.
39. Cfr. ibid., pp. 201-202.
40. Cfr. ibid., p. 80. Also, L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations
of Ethics», pp. 540-544.
tion to virtue or virtuous motivation. Agent-based ethics makes the stron-
ger claim on the relation between virtue and rightness.
»[...] Common teleological forms make the concept of a good life
the fundamental ethical concept and a virtue is explicated in terms of its
contribution to a good life, either as a means to it or as a constituent of it.
Aristotle’s ethics is arguably of this kind. A more radical, non-teleological
form of virtue ethics makes the virtues or other internal properties of the
agent ethically fundamental, and the good is treated as a derivative con-
cept. This is what I am calling agent-based ethics»41.
Goodness is said to just “shine” from a good person, because that
person is noble and not simply currying their own favour through good be-
haviour42. They are not said to be good in relation to anything indepen-
dently of them which is identified as good43. Although an intrinsic virtue
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41. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «An Agent-Based Approach to the Problem of Evil», Internatio-
nal Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 39 (1996) 129.
42. Cfr. ibid., p. 130. Zagzebski says that the most compelling reason for preferring
an agent-based approach is experiential, given that we can know a person to be good,
from the sanctity that exudes from them, prior to an investigation of their behaviour (cfr.
ibid). I think that we need to distinguish here, though, between how we know of someo-
ne’s goodness and the actual causes of goodness in that person.
43. Once again, I would comment that although the shine of goodness may very
well be an indicator of rightness and virtue, L.’s discussion of the ontological grounding
of goodness does not explicitly address the relation between being (esse) and the good.
Zagzebski says that the inner goodness of human beings is derived from the inner good-
ness of God (cfr. ibid., p. 132), and that human motives are good in so far as they are si-
milar to the divine motives since God’s nature is the metaphysical foundation of all va-
lue (cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations of Ethics», p. 540).
«God is internally perfect and the goodness of the objects of his choice derives from the
goodness of his own nature. Something is good if and because it is the object of choice
of an innerly perfect being» («An Agent-Based Approach to the Problem of Evil», p.
132), «given an agent-based ethics, it follows immediately that whatever God is motiva-
ted to bring about is good and whatever God is motivated to do is right» (ibid., p. 134).
What though is God’s nature? Linda Zagzebski believes that God has motivations and
proposes a Divine Motive Theory as a replacement for the Divine Command Theory,
«My proposal is to retain the focus of moral evaluation on the person, but to shift it
away from the will, both when we are talking about God and when we are talking about
human beings, and to focus instead on emotion. I suggest that moral properties in the
primary sense attach to emotions. Emotions are good or bad in themselves; they do not
derive their goodness or badness from their relation to anything else that is good or bad»
(L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations of Ethics», pp. 540-541). Ac-
cording to her agent-based ethics, then, L. Zagzebski argues that although a parent’s
love for her child is good, she does not act that way because it is good (cfr. ibid., p.
133). And so «the reason why one person loves another is independent of the goodness
of the person loved and even of the goodness of the love itself» (ibid., p. 134). Both Di-
vine Command Theory and Divine Motivation Theory overlook the relation between
God’s choices and His intellect. The more fundamental notion of God’s nature as Ipsum
Esse Subsistens (cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 4, a. 2, co & r. 3), moreo-
ver, leads us to a discussion of the morality of a human act as dependent upon the object
theory has the additional difficulty of needing to articulate the goodness of
each virtue on its own merits, the implication from the above considera-
tions is that a teleological virtue theory would not attract the interest of
philosophers in the epistemic field44.
«The most important difference between happiness-based and mo-
tivation-based theories is that the former explain the good of a virtue teleo-
logically. Virtue is good because of its connection to the thing that is more
fundamentally good, namely, eudaimonia. In the motivation-based ethics I
will present, virtues are not good because they lead to or are components of
something else that is the primary good, so their goodness is not explained te-
leologically. [...] The difficulty for this kind of theory is to make it plausible
that each of the virtues is good in a fundamental, non-derivative way, and if
the theory goes on to derive the concepts of the good and of a right act from
the concept of a virtue, the virtues must be such that they are capable of ha-
ving such a function. One advantage of this type of theory is that many phi-
losophers like the concept of virtue but are suspicious of teleology»45.
A concrete agent-based virtue theory is developed by Zagzebski in
line with Montmarquet’s idea about characterising the virtues according to
motivation46. A proper motivation distinguishes a reliable cognitive faculty
or intellectual skill from a moral virtue. While Zagzebski thinks it intuiti-
vely right that thinking and feeling be different states, and the empirical
experience of slow saints and smart sinners confirms such intuition, she
believes that instead of «splitting» thinking from feeling, we should look
rather to the nexus between them: the emotions that motivate us. If we are
to continue speaking of intellectual rather than moral virtues then, it is only
on the «theoretical grounds» that the intellectual ones are motivated by
knowledge and the moral ones by the good, keeping in mind that knowled-
ge is a form of good and her belief that the intellectual virtues should be a
subset of the moral virtues47.
The goodness of a virtuous act does not depend upon the goodness
of the object it pursues but rather upon the nobility or goodness of the mo-
tive with which it was inspired (and its success in achieving the aim of the
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF LINDA ZAGZEBSKI 279
of an act and not just the intention with, or motive from, which it is performed. What
matters is that a parent love her child according to the right order of things and not that
it be done in a strictly calculating way. Just because we do not usually run consciously
through the rules of forming a correct syllogism does not mean that they are of no ac-
count in our everyday judgements. So too, the rectitude with which we love, and its on-
tological grounding, are of the utmost importance to our consideration of the good and
of the virtues.
44. Cfr. VOM, p. 83.
45. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
46. Cfr. ibid., p. 174.
47. Cfr. ibid., p. 139.
motivation). But when it comes to specifying a particular virtue we find
that the distinguishing factor is not so much the motivational force of the
agent, but rather that such motivational force is defined in terms of the ob-
ject it pursues:
«benevolence [...] is characteristically motivated to bring about the well-
being of others and is reliably successful in doing so. Courage [...] to risk
danger to himself when something of greater value is at stake [...] Justice
[...] to respect others as persons»48.
The internal is manifested by the external, and the external is seen
in the objects pursued. The virtuous motivations themselves are distin-
guished, then, according to their aim i.e. the intentional object of the mo-
tivation49. The aim of an intellectual virtue need not be confined to the
alethic pursuit of true belief, but may also include such considerations as
wisdom and understanding50. Motives are held to be broader than aims ho-
wever.
«I think it confuses the nature of motives to identify them solely by
their ends for several reasons. For one thing, more than one motive can
have the same end, e.g., there is more than one motive aimed at getting a
job. More importantly, even though the end does figure into the psycholo-
gical structure of the motive, there is more in the motive than the end at
which it aims. Motives are essentially pushy states, not pulling states, and
we can see this by comparing motive-explanation with means-end explana-
tion of human action.
»[...] A motive explanation tells us why the agent does x, not be-
cause x leads to y and the agent aims at y, but because x-behavior exhibits
motive M and we understand what it is like to be in state M and we see that
x-behavior is part of a pattern of behavior exhibiting M. This is why insight
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48. Ibid., p. 165.
49. Zagzebski says that the intellectual virtues all arise from the motivation of
knowledge, but each has a particular motivational component that distinguishes it from
the other intellectual virtues, «to the extent that the motivational component of a parti-
cular virtue can be traced to a deeper motivation, an act of virtue of that kind must be
successful in bringing about the end of the deeper motivation, as well as the particular
one. [...] an act of open-mindedness must not only be successful in making the agent re-
ceptive to new ideas and arguments but must contribute in a significant way to the
agent’s acquisition of knowledge» (ibid., pp. 252-253). She puzzles over wisdom howe-
ver as it does not seem to have any particular end (cfr. ibid., p. 133). Zagzebski does not
speak about the intentional nature of these ends but Fairweather has no qualms in so
doing, «This end will be defined in terms of the intentional content of a certain desire
(or set of desires). The type of desire we are interested in as epistemologists is the desi-
re for truth» (A. FAIRWEATHER, «Epistemic Motivation», L. ZAGZEBSKI, A. FAIRWEA-
THER (eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 70).
50. Cfr. VOM, pp. 168-176. Also A. FAIRWEATHER, «Epistemic Motivation», p. 70.
into the emotions of characters in novels explains so much of their beha-
vior, and why insight of this kind leads us to predict the future behavior of
others. Motive explanation gives us understanding of the agent’s psychic
structure»51.
Zagzebski also says that a motive tells us why someone did what
they did i.e. if an end provides us with an explanation for a certain act, a
motive provides us with an explanation for the end pursued52. For all that,
the interesting point to note from Zagzebski’s distinction of virtues/moti-
vations according to ends is that, at least for heuristic purposes, teleology
has not been altogether abandoned in her motivational theory. But the tele-
ological dimension to her motivation-based theory goes deeper than that
because she believes that these motivations can be trained and so normati-
vely regulated53. If we are to seek something that we do not yet possess, be
it happiness, or nobility, or an intrinsically good motivation, or a soul in
harmony, then we are dealing with a teleological virtue theory because we
are dealing with purposes for action (final causes). In fact, as will be seen
in our discussion about naturalist normativity and the «value problem»,
Zagzebski seems to have now changed tack in her agent-based project by
grounding the value of her motivations in the more fundamental motiva-
tion for eudaimonia 54.
1.3.2. Motivations as Stable Emotions
Zagzebski finds support for her theory of virtuous emotions in the
work already undertaken by Hilary Kornblith and James Montmarquet
who say that the agent desires to have true beliefs55. Zagzebski’s focus on
motivation for ethical assessment parallels Kant’s evaluation of practical
reason, however, with the difference that the emotions take the place of the
will or practical reason. The role of the rational will in belief is absent from
Zagzebski’s work because she doubts that the will itself exists56, and so
choice depends upon the internal motivation of emotion rather than on a
clearly defined volitional intention in reference to an exterior object. «The-
re may typically be a difference in the degree of the voluntariness of fee-
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51. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Hot and Cold Irrationality», pro manuscripto, 2001, p. 11.
52. Cfr. ibid., p. 12.
53. Cfr. VOM, p. 132.
54. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good», pro ma-
nusripto, 2002, p. 22.
55. Cfr. VOM, p. 174.
56. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Responses», Philosophical and Phenomenological Rese-
arch, 60 (2000) 216.
lings and virtues, but it is probably not a difference of kind»57. Our inten-
tions boil down to being motivations then. What is a motivation? «A moti-
vation is an emotion-disposition that initiates and directs action towards an
end»58.
In her correspondence with me, Zagzebski states that what she me-
ans by an emotion is the following:
«emotion is a state that has both cognitive and affective components that
are necessarily connected. An emotion is not just a feeling. It is not even a
feeling that is in response to some perception. A certain way of perceiving,
under what I call a thick affective concept, is an intrinsic part of the emo-
tion. A judgment can be an expression of emotion in that the agent can jud-
ge that her way of construing the intentional object of her emotion is co-
rrect. Both the state of emotion itself has a cognitive component, and the
expression of emotion in a propositional judgment, is cognitive. That is
important for motivation-based virtue theory because a motive is just what
we call an emotion when it is producing an act. A good motive is hence a
good emotion, and a good emotion is one that is correct. It fits the way the
world is in a way that suits the emotional capacities of the human being.
That is intended to be analogous to the good of true belief. A true belief is
a belief that fits the way the world is in a way that also fits the cognitive
(and maybe perceptual) capacities of the human knower. So motivation-
based virtue theory is intended to be based on what we might call emotio-
nal accuracy»59.
This to me seems right in the sense that a good philosopher or rese-
archer should also react affectively, and not just «logically», in determined
ways with respect to the world e.g. someone who gazes on the starry hea-
vens should be filled with awe and wonder. One is reminded of St James’s
observation that although the devils might hold a true belief in the existen-
ce of God, they tremble60.
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57. VOM, p. 128. It must be pointed out, however, that Zagzebski has a very broad
understanding of what an emotion is because she does not confine such a state to those
who have bodies. She interprets the «feeling» state of an emotion more as a state of
consciousness in the way that Descartes did, and translates Aquinas’ intellectual «affec-
tiones» of love and joy as «emotions» (cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The
Foundations of Ethics», pp. 545-546). An emotion has a cognitive as well as a «feeling»
component (cfr. ibid., p. 541). It is for this reason that Zagzebski can make the follo-
wing claim, «I submit that God has emotions» (ibid., p. 544). She cites compassion, for-
giveness and love as examples of what motivates God (cfr. ibid., p. 546).
58. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Précis of Virtues of the Mind», p. 172. Fairweather describes a
motivation as a desire that exerts power over our conduct (cfr. A. FAIRWEATHER, «Epis-
temic Motivation», p. 70).
59. This quote has been taken from an e-mail Linda sent me on the 18th of March,
2002.
60. Cfr. James 2:19.
Zagzebski argues that by focusing on the epistemic motivation we
can see not only what a person believes but also why someone came to the
belief that they did61. If the process followed in the formation of a belief
has been a non-veritic one e.g. in wanting to be socially accepted rather
than that of acting according to the evidence, then that belief can hardly be
taken as a justified one, even if it should turn out to be true62. In other
words, «S’s belief that p» is not justifiable if the good reasons S might have
for believing p have not motivated S’s belief. The evidence needs to be
used as evidence 63, and our alethic motivations provide us with the psy-
chological link that joins belief to evidence64. The same could also hold for
Sosa-like reflective knowledge about our perceptual beliefs. An animal
forms beliefs about its environment according to sensory impacts. The
more intelligent an animal is, the better it can contrast its perceptual re-
ports with (remembered) background information and contrary evidence.
In humans, our reflective knowledge not only calls for a certain understan-
ding of the origin of our perceptual impressions in conformity with some
form of coherence constraint (Sosa), it should not be formed in an irres-
ponsible way (Zagzebski) either65.
Motivations also play an important role in the (Greco-like) reliabi-
lity of our beliefs as true ones. When faced with the same evidence, diffe-
rent epistemic agents can wind up with quite different beliefs due to their
having different motives. The different situations of the prisoners in Pla-
to’s cavern are a result of the different desires each type has in seeking cul-
tural opinion, logical rationality or (possibly uncomfortable) truth66.
«A person motivated by the goal of holding novel beliefs will res-
pond differently to evidence that makes P likely to be true than would a
person motivated to have true beliefs. For the former, the evidence for P
would serve as a disincentive to accepting P, since P is the typical thing to
believe in the circumstances. For the latter, the evidence for P serves as an
incentive to accepting P, since P is likely to be true»67.
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61. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Précis of Virtues of the Mind», p. 71.
62. Cfr. ibid., p. 74.
63. Cfr. ibid., p. 75.
64. Cfr. ibid., p. 79.
65. Cfr. ibid., pp. 77-78. The role of motivations in our perceptually based beliefs
is admittedly weak. It is not easy to imagine cases of the irresponsible but coherent for-
mation of perceptual beliefs (be they right or wrong) in anyone that is not (by definition)
suffering from some severe psychic disorder.
66. Cfr. A. LLANO, Enigma de la representación, Síntesis, Madrid 1999, Chapter 3.
67. A. FAIRWEATHER, «Epistemic Motivation», p. 71. It is not the case that S should
already believe p to be a true proposition and therefore desires to believe p. Rather, S
believes that there are strong indications of p’s truth, and it is on that count which leads
S to affirm that p (cfr. ibid., p. 72).
In short, someone who is interested in getting to the truth of a mat-
ter makes the kind of cognitive effort that confers justification and makes
for the reliable formation of true beliefs; epistemic failure is usually due to
a lack of motivation68.
What would motivate someone to want knowledge? To possess po-
wer (Hobbes) or at least sufficient power in order to effectively interact
with the world (Dewey). «Hobbes says that cognitive virtues and vices ari-
se from differences in a motivation, and that motivation is a passion that
admits of excess, deficiency, and distortion of various sorts, and this seems
to me to be generally right»69. Says Hobbes,
«The causes of this difference of wits are in the passions, and the
difference of passions proceeded partly from the different constitution of
the body and partly from different education. For if the difference proceeds
from the temper of the brain and the organs of sense, either exterior or inte-
rior, there would be no less difference of men in their sight, hearing, or ot-
her sense than in their fancies and discretions. It proceeds, therefore, from
the passions, which are different not only from the difference of men’s
complexions, but also from their difference of customs and education.
»The passions that most of all cause the difference of wit are prin-
cipally the more or less desire of power, of riches, of knowledge, and of ho-
nour. All which may be reduced to the first —that is, desire of power—.
For riches, knowledge and honour are but several sorts of power.
»And therefore a man who has no great passion for any of these
things but is, as men term it, indifferent, though he may be so far a good
man as to be free from giving offense, yet he cannot possibly have either a
great fancy or much judgement. For the thoughts are to the desires as scouts
and spies, to range abroad and find the way to the things desired, all steadi-
ness of the mind’s motion, and all quickness of the same, proceeding from
thence; for as to have no desire is to be dead, so to have weak passions is
dullness; and to have passions indifferently for everything, GIDDINESS
and distraction; and to have stronger and more vehement passions for anyt-
hing than is ordinarily seen in others is that which men call MADNESS»70.
Dewey, too, sees the foundation of these virtues as being a motiva-
tion, because knowledge of good intellectual methods alone is insufficient
for one to know well; one also needs the desire or will to employ them, and
vice-versa.
«Because of the importance of attitudes, ability to train thought is
not achieved merely by knowledge of the best forms of thought. Possession
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68. Cfr. ibid., p. 73.
69. VOM, p. 170.
70. T. HOBBES, The Leviathan, Macmillan, New York 1958, Part I, Chapter 8, pp.
68-69. Cited in VOM, pp. 169-170.
of this information is no guarantee for ability to think well. Moreover, the-
re are no set exercises in correct thinking whose repeated performance will
cause one to be a good thinker. The information realizes their value except
as he is personally animated by certain dominant attitudes in his own cha-
racter. [...]
Knowledge of the methods alone will not suffice; there must be the
desire, the will, to employ them. This desire is an affair of personal disposi-
tion. But on the other hand the disposition alone will not suffice. There
must also be understanding of the forms and techniques that are the chan-
nels through which these attitudes operate to the best advantage»71.
Zagzebski makes the observation that, «He thus traces a path from
our motivations to believe truly and to act effectively to the formation of
“attitudes” or intellectual virtues that lead us to employ certain methods of
thinking and forming beliefs»72. A virtuous person is motivated to act with
the intellectual qualities of open-mindedness, etc, when forming and sus-
taining their beliefs. Motivations that need to be entrenched, in the face of
resistance, in order for them to be virtues, and such entrenchment aids their
leading to the truth. A properly functioning mind is suitably trained, thus,
to care about the right things73.
When our motivation for truth becomes a well balanced emotion, it
can assist reason by presenting it with appropriate items to focus on, can
help maintain our attention on those items we are reasoning about, and
then help us to retain that knowledge in our memory74. Homework done by
a student slouched in front of a TV displays a different degree of quality
from that done by a more motivated individual who studies in silence at a
well illuminated desk. Well trained emotions also enable us to empathise
with others. Oliver Sacks’ An Anthropologist on Mars 75 recounts the story
of an autistic scientist who was quite unable to understand plays like Ro-
meo and Juliet or tell when people were pulling her leg because she could
not experience the same range of emotions as a normal person could76.
Wood continues,
«Aesthetic insight and interpretative understanding, no less than
matters of personal relations, require the contribution of tutored emotions.
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71. J. DEWEY, How We Think, D. C. Heath and Co., Boston 1933, pp. 29-30. Cited
in VOM, pp. 172-173.
72. Ibid., p. 173.
73. Cfr. W.J., WOOD, Epistemology, Becoming Intellectually Virtuous, InterVarsity
Press, Downers Grove (USA) 1998, p. 175.
74. Cfr. ibid., p. 178.
75. Cfr. O. SACKS, Un antropólogo en Marte: siete relatos paradójicos, Anagrama,
Barcelona 1997.
76. Cfr. W.J., WOOD, Epistemology, p. 179.
Imagine asking a person of limited or stunted emotional development to
provide a nuanced analysis of the characterization in a psychologically
complex novel. To grasp sufficiently the motivational structure of its key
personalities would require empathic skills sufficient to see things from the
point of view of its characters. Someone emotionally shallow or perverse
would likely be blind to these subtleties. Anyone with a dictionary can dis-
cover what the words of a poem mean, but not necessarily the sentiments
such words are meant to convey»77.
Right affections do not manufacture evidence but they do allow us
to put the evidence into proper perspective in a way that vices such as self-
deception or excessive self-interest do not78. They help us have eyes to see
and ears to hear. Does it take virtue (or properly ordered affections) to re-
cognise virtue? Must we enter into the hermeneutical loop of using infor-
mation en route to understanding that same information? Wood says that
such circularity is not vicious since, as with any basic belief, we must re-
gard our received traditions as prima facie justified —a justification which
can be overridden79—.
Zagzebski believes that, with training, emotions can become stable
states of the soul80, somewhat akin to the Romantic ideal of the beautiful
soul (schöne Seele). «Motives tend to be persistent and become disposi-
tions, at which point they become components of enduring traits of charac-
ter —virtues or vices—»81. A virtuous person would be motivated by a
praise-worthy emotion e.g. to protect something valuable (courage), or to
see people treated equitably (fairness)82. Nor do they need to be dramatic
emotions in order to motivate us, just as thirst successfully regulates our li-
quid intake without our paying much attention to it. Zagzebski gives the
examples of such «low-level» emotions as pride in one’s work or of a dull
sense of anxiety, which push us to get our jobs done83. Motives can range
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77. Ibid., p. 186.
78. Cfr. ibid., pp. 190-191.
79. Cfr. ibid., pp. 195-196.
80. Cfr. ibid., p. 132.
81. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations of Ethics», p. 541.
82. Hatred, bitterness, and envy are held to be blameworthy, just as love and sym-
pathy are praised, without particular regard to the circumstances (cfr. VOM, pp. 126-
127). Aristotle would not disagree with that claim however, because the irascible and
concupiscent appetites participate in the cultivation of the rational faculties, i.e. the will
and intellect. But Zagzebski also rejects Aristotle’s claim that the virtues are different
from the passions as modes of choice (cfr. ibid., p. 127). She argues that virtues such as
patience, compassion, kindness, or bravery are no more modes of choice than are such
passions such as anger or fear. My present fear depends upon my previous cowardice,
which depends upon my previous choices. Both feelings and virtues are indirectly and
not directly affected by choice. Virtues and passions are not easily distinguished thence.
83. Cfr. ibid., p. 132.
from instinctive feelings, hunger and thirst; then emotions; and then on-
wards to duties that go entirely against the grain. Motives initiate and di-
rect our action, and they tend to be persistent. Zagzebski holds virtues, entren-
ched emotional motivations, to be different to fleeting feelings on the grounds
that virtues are excellences, and that feelings cannot be refrained from, in a
given moment of time, as an act can, or a habit (in a derivative way).
1.3.3. Motivations and Moral Judgement
Zagzebski’s theory of motivation comes to the fore when conside-
ring our everyday moral evaluations: «that’s wrong», «that’s groovy»,
«he’s lying», «fascist!». These are «thick» descriptions because they are
also evaluative in such a way that the description would change in mea-
ning if were to «thin» it of its normative content. The problems that our
everyday «thick» evaluations pose to purely cognitivist or purely emotive
theories of moral knowledge arise when we consider why epistemic agents
might view the same descriptive intentional content in different ways or
why similarly «thick» descriptions motivate some agents to act in conse-
quence more than with others.
From a logical point of view, the formation of a moral proposition
is a purely cognitive state that is either true or false, and in itself does not
imply that an agent need act in consequence with what is a purely specula-
tive judgement. Many a thief would denounce the evils of robbery. A Car-
tesian philosopher need not surprise herself that the inclinations of the
body should be quite independent of the mind’s decisions. But it so hap-
pens that the truth is actually a motivating force.
«If we want to convince someone to act a certain way for moral re-
asons, we direct our efforts towards convincing her of the truth of a particu-
lar moral judgment. As long as we can get her to make the judgment unre-
servedly herself, we normally think that she will thereby be motivated to
act on it. Of course, we know that she may not be sufficiently motivated to
act on it because she may also have contrary motives, but the point is that
we think that all we need do to get her to feel a motive to act on a moral
judgment is to get her to make the judgment»84.
Zagzebski says that moral judgements are both cognitive and moti-
vating, and refers to this thesis as «Motivational Judgement Internalism»85.
In classical theory a practical judgement to do this or avoid that always in-
volves a command of the will that is permeated through by a knowledge
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about what should be done. It seems, however, that Zagzebski is referring
more here to the persuasive power of the plain truth in the build up to our
speculative judgements (beliefs) about the ethics of certain actions or be-
liefs. The problem that she poses is the following. «Cognitivists» study the
speculative side to our moral judgements but can give no account as to
how they motivate us, and non-cognitivists face the opposite problem of
being unable to account for the cognitive and intentional content of our
emotions. Zagzebski says that this dilemma is reflected in akrasia or moral
weakness, which is something that not only exists, but that it’s very exis-
tence should surprise us86.
«It often happens that a person makes a moral judgment while un-
derstanding the judgment perfectly well, and yet lacks sufficient motiva-
tion to act on it. Notice that if the making of a moral judgment is a purely
cognitive state this is no mystery on the standard psychology since on that
view motivation does not come from the judgment anyway. But that does
not solve the problem of moral weakness; it simply refuses to see it as a
problem. Ever since Aristotle the existence of akrasia has been treated as
something that needs explaining because in some sense we think Socrates
in the Protagoras must have been right: If a person really understands what
she is doing when she makes a moral judgment, she would automatically
feel motivated to act on it and, in fact, she would act on it and would not
have to struggle to do so»87.
Cognitivists are not surprised that a given decision should call for
struggle to be put into practice because they believe that there is nothing in-
trinsically motivating about the decision. But surely this interior split within
the unified agent is something quite odd? Cognitivists are not surprised
about the unified agent’s internal contradictions but they should be. Emoti-
vist theories accept that there is such a thing as moral strength or moral we-
akness but it cannot comprehend how a moral agent could be apathetic i.e.
make moral judgements and then not act on them88. Emotivists are right to
be surprised but they cannot give an adequate account for thinking one
thing and doing another. Perhaps we could say that the virtuous person is
less clouded by desire and so is better able to recognise the more salient
moral features in a judgement than is the continent or akratic person. But,
says Zagzebski, if cognitive activity per se is not intrinsically motivating,
then there is no reason why a more intense cognitive perception should lead
to a more motivated choice in line with that perception89. Zagzebski’s res-
ponse is to urge that our feelings not be disassociated from our thinking.
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«So the compassionate person appreciates the fact that a co-wor-
kers child is gravely ill in a way that the discompassionate does not. The
envious person appreciates the fact that a co-worker’s salary is higher than
his own in a way that the non-envious does not. This suggests that to appre-
ciate is not just to understand, but to feel the force of that which is appre-
ciated»90.
When we approve of one thing or condemn another, we do not se-
parate our cognitive from our affective states because the structure of emo-
tion requires that they be connected91. We need an epistemic theory that
explicitly recognises that our «thick» «here and now» judgements that
«that’s a lie» or «he is contemptible» or «that is rude» are of inseparable
evaluative and descriptive content92. This is where Zagzebski’s motiva-
tion-based theory steps in.
«Specifically, I will propose that a ground level judgment has the
following features: (1) It is an expression of emotion, and for that reason is
intrinsically motivating. (2) It is propositional in form, with a truth value
(and it is not always false), and the agent asserts that proposition when ma-
king the judgment»93.
Zagzebski seeks to underline the co-existence of feelings with our
cognitive judgements.
«The thesis that cognitive and affective states are necessarily dis-
tinct is generally accompanied by the view that affective states are respon-
ses to cognitive or perceptual states. That is, we have feelings in response
to a prior state of representing the world a certain way. And it cannot be de-
nied that some feeling states are nothing but responses to a prior represen-
tational state. But not all are, and this is important»94.
She uses the example of «that is rude» to show how, whether or not
the actual concept should mix evaluative and descriptive content, it is im-
portant to recognise that in the agent that grasps this concept he needs to be
in more than just a cognitive state in order to appreciate the force and mea-
ning of the judgement95. Says Zagzebski,
«there is no purely descriptive feature of the object of offense that adequa-
tely captures that which is offensive. This is not to deny that the cognitive
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grasp of purely descriptive features of some situation, together with my
emotional dispositions, causes my emotional response; in fact, I believe
that that is probably the case. Nor is it to deny that offensiveness superve-
nes on those descriptive features, although I am not going to address the
supervenience thesis here. It is simply to say that to see something as rude
is not just to see it as having those descriptive properties, nor is it to see
that something has caused me to feel offended, nor is it to see the two to-
gether. It is to see it as the intentional object of the feeling of offense. I do
not just feel offended by the rude behavior, I feel offended at it. Rude is,
then, a concept that combines descriptive and affective in a way that can-
not be pulled apart. The conclusion is that rude is a thick affective con-
cept»96.
I think that it is interesting to note here that Zagzebski allows for a
certain causal priority in our descriptive knowledge upon which our eva-
luative judgements like «that is rude» or «she is kind» depend. We see here
an implicit recognition of the difference between those cognitive acts that
are directed toward a knowledge of how the world is and a knowledge of
how the world and ourselves should in some way depend upon us. As a re-
sult, I don’t see why we should not be able to distinguish between the mo-
ral and practical intellectual virtues of Zagzebski’s motivation-based virtue
theory and the speculative intellectual virtues of classical theory. Her the-
sis is that people who are in different emotional states will see the intentio-
nal descriptive content within a moral judgement in a different way. To
sum up,
«The general picture of moral judgment I have been describing
goes as follows: A situation has certain descriptive features D. My percep-
tual and cognitive awareness of D, together with my emotional disposi-
tions, causes me to be a certain emotional state E. E is an affective state
whose intentional object is the D situation seen as falling under a thick
concept A. I cannot see situation D as A without being in emotion E. I can
express emotion E by making the judgment, “That is A.” For example, a
situation has the descriptive feature of being a remark that expresses dis-
dain for me and is uncalled for. My awareness of this feature, together
with my emotional dispositions, leads me to be in a distinctive emotional
state consisting of feeling offended at the rudeness of the remark. In this
emotional state I see the remark as rude. I may express my emotion by
simply saying “That is rude”. This judgment expresses an intrinsically mo-
tivating state since it expresses an emotion; it is also propositional in form
with a truth value, and I am asserting that proposition when I say “That is
rude”»97.
290 RICHARD J. UMBERS
96. Ibid., pp. 12-13.
97. Ibid., p. 16.
1.4. Reliability and Epistemic Luck: Virtu et Fortuna
«The motivation to gain knowledge of a certain sort and to act in a
certain way does not reliably lead to success, although it reliably leads the
agent to do as much in her power to be successful»98. Motivation and suc-
cess are distinct components to a virtue. A virtuous person must know so-
mething of the world in which they apply their virtue —which is what dis-
tinguishes the courageous from the foolhardy, or the prudent from the
cowardly— and so a reliability component is built into the nature of a vir-
tue, «a virtuous person cannot be systematically wrong in her judgements
about the world as they apply to her feelings and choices»99. A virtuous
agent is concerned about external success, which is indeed one of the rea-
sons why we call a virtue by that name in the first place. Intellectual vir-
tues are knowledge-conducive by definition, because failure to do so
would lead us to not classify such trait as an intellectual virtue. It is not
sufficient to have a praiseworthy motivation, then, in order to be held in
fullest esteem. One must also be reliably successful in achieving the goals
aimed at, and that means confronting the issue of luck.
Zagzebski puts the internalist-externalist dispute down to ambiva-
lence over the role that luck plays in normative theory100. Moral luck invol-
ves blame or praise that goes beyond one’s immediate control of a situa-
tion based upon the consequences of that blameworthy or praiseworthy
action101. One may be responsible for what one does or believes, even if
what one does or believes depends upon factors that our beyond our con-
trol102. Let us take Nagel’s example of the conferral of the Nobel Prize103. If
the Nobel Prize were to be awarded in retrospect, it would preferentially
go to Einstein rather than to poor Sir Isaac Newton. Other instances of mo-
ral luck crop up in our justice system. A drunken driver who swerves and
hits people is charged with manslaughter; a drunk who swerves but hits no
one faces lesser charges104. Moral luck is also present in the different cir-
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102. Cfr. G. AXTELL, «Epistemic Luck in Light of the Virtues», L. ZAGZEBSKI, A.
FAIRWEATHER (eds.), Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p.
161. Epistemic compatabilism concerns the conjoint existence of cognitive freedom
from coercion and causal factors beyond our control (cfr. ibid).
103. Cfr. ibid., p. 162.
104. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Religious Luck», p. 398.
cumstances faced by similar people. Citizens of Nazi Germany are more
severely judged for their tacit co-operation than are the citizens of other
countries who were living under different circumstances105. Two people sin
mortally, one dies but the other lives and then repents and receives sacra-
mental absolution. The first one goes to hell and the latter to heaven. Says
Zagzebski, «Both moral and religious luck involve an inequality in the
way persons are treated by the institution of morality itself»106. Instead of
just shrugging our shoulders at the presence of life’s unfairness, a rational
response to the problem of luck is to seek to minimise its impact, and that
means shifting from consequentialist paradigms, where the greatest degree
of luck exists, to character based ones107.
«If we [...] trace a line backwards from the consequences of an act,
to the physical act itself, to the intention to perform the act, to the psychic
states out of which the intention is formed, to the enduring character traits
from which the act arises, we find that the farther back we go, the less luck
there is»108.
Epistemic externalists regard luck as working for us under normal
circumstances. The reliabilist condition to knowledge reduces the probabi-
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106. Ibid., p. 403. Zagzebski goes on to say that, «If there is no incompatabilist free
will, then our moral acts, choices, and traits of character are wholly a matter of luck. If
there is incompatabilist free will, then they are only partly a matter of luck. This is be-
cause the claim that there is incompatabilist free will is merely the claim that past cir-
cumstances, including many beyond a person’s control, strongly influence a person’s
choice. So no matter which way we go on free will, there is luck» (ibid., p. 403). Za-
gebski says that this is just as true for our character traits (our virtues and vices) because
they chiefly depend upon our imitation of the people we grow up with, and that is a fac-
tor well beyond our control (cfr. ibid., p. 400). Although Zagzebski tackles the question
of God’s providence head on in her article «Religious Luck», I am not in agreement
with her on this point. She leaves out the question of gaining merit for heaven (as
though heaven were enjoyed in equal amounts by all) and the question of corresponden-
ce to the unequal amount of graces received. Zagzebski doubts that there is such a thing
as the proportion of control we have in our evaluated actions given that our actual cir-
cumstances and so virtues (of sincerity for example) are factors largely beyond our con-
trol (cfr. ibid., pp. 408-409). But surely external influence is taken into account in God’s
judgement, even with respect to our character traits, so that responsibility be determined
qua what is truly free in our past and present decisions. Although we ourselves would
prove unreliable judges on this point (1 Cor 4: 3-4) an all knowing agent would be quite
up to the task without the need for an apocatastasis and unhitching of morality from sal-
vation in order to eliminate all moral luck as suggested by Zagzebski (cfr. ibid., p. 411).
Says Davidson, «just because something strongly influences my choice, this does not
make my choice a matter of luck, especially if even very strong influences can be resis-
ted in acting freely» (S. DAVISON, «Salvific Luck», International Journal for Philo-
sophy of Religion, 45 [1999] 129-137).
107. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Virtues of God and The Foundations of Ethics», p. 401.
108. Ibid.
lity of a Gettier coincidence occurring —lucky guesses are few and far bet-
ween109—. But even that assumption may be largely relaxed in a virtue ap-
proach because character traits reduce the component of luck110. The moti-
vational component to epistemic virtue eliminates even Gettier cases
because the agent acts on the evidence in the light of the evidence.
Axtell argues that the presence of luck in knowledge is a tricky one
that cannot be easily dispensed with111. Indeed, even an «incompatabilist»
approach, which simply filters out all cases of epistemic luck from our
knowledge claims, is itself open to the skeptical challenge of being prone
to luck112. In reply to a skeptic’s objection that despite all our efforts are
epistemic beliefs are all wrong because we might be inhabiting a demon
controlled world, the responsible internalist must simply put that possibi-
lity down to veritic luck113. The presence of veritic luck means that, all else
being equal, in some given counterfactual situation your belief could easily
have turned out to be false114. Recall our Gettier examples. Had Brown not
been in Barcelona, then Smith’s belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is
in Barcelona would have turned out to be a false. Likewise, in the fake
barn example, the motorist could easily have spotted a fake barn instead
and so she would have formed a false belief about the quality of the barn115.
Externalism is meant to counter these skeptical considerations in
their source because, whatever the process used for coming into a know-
ledgeable state, it must be veritically reliable. But there is no real reason
why an internalist approach cannot ask that the grounds for one’s belief be
reliably truth-conducive116. Where externalism curries more favour is that
we increase our chances of being veritically lucky if we relax the interna-
list constraint that said factors need also be cognitively accessible to the
knowing subject. Note that I say «veritically lucky» because it is surely a
matter of luck whether or not an externalist is externally justified or not117.
The externalist cannot chuckle at the internalist’s misfortune, because the
skeptic then asks what makes him any different from his doppelganger in
the demon world118. It is simply a matter of evidential luck that you are fed
valid inputs and your doppelganger is not. Evidential or «justification-
oriented» luck occurs where, given the circumstances, the agent could ea-
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sily have been unjustified in her belief119. Consider the case of the assassi-
nated president. In order to buy time while they work out what to do Penta-
gon officials leak false reports to the different news agencies that only an
aide of the president’s has been shot. By coincidence Jill just happens to
tune into the only radio station that is broadcasting the truth of the matter
because its reporter was an eye-witness to the event. Jill’s true belief, that
the president has been assassinated, could easily have been the false one,
that he had not, had she turned to any other news source.
There is no prima facie advantage of externalist responses over inter-
nalist ones in the issue of luck therefore. Whether or not such luck precludes
our having knowledge or not will depend upon whether the counterfactual
possibilities of getting it wrong are serious or not120. If the fake barns are mi-
les away then the motorist’s belief that she has a fine barn in front of her is
veritically lucky, but not in a knowledge-precluding way because the chan-
ces of spotting a fake barn are close to zero. The less accessible some defea-
ting source of information is, the less likely it is that the justification of Jill’s
belief (which has been based on a usually reliable source of information)
will turn out to be evidentially lucky in a knowledge-precluding way.
Zagzebski’s virtue-based «mixed» externalist approach to justifica-
tion provides us with a more adequate response to the skeptic121. The dual
component account of motivations and reliability in virtue is an acknow-
ledgement of the «gaps problem» within epistemology122. The very need to
hold a mixed account is already a sign that purely internal or purely exter-
nal constraints cannot provide the right conditions for epistemizing justifi-
cation123. Internalist theories face a «veritic» gap between the truth of their
belief and its justifiedness. The veritic gap correlates with the consequen-
tialist form of luck to which internalists must cow-tow124. Externalist theo-
ries, on the other hand, conceive of a necessary connection between know-
ledge and its object, and so they do provide a conceptual link between
justified belief and truth (assuming that we have been lucky enough to en-
counter a veritically reliable means of belief-formation). But they face
their own gap between belief (propositional acceptance) and good reasons
or adequate evidence. Axtell calls this the «zetetic» gap in reference to the
quality of the researcher and the evidential or circumstantial luck the rese-
archer might have in winning the Nobel prize or not125. A virtue approach
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promises to be able to handle the epistemic importance of these gaps and
provide positive accounts of knowledge and justification in the light of
them, instead of simply sniping at the other camp’s misfortunes126. If any
epistemic agent is likely to seek to minimise the chances of «easily» for-
ming the contrary belief in close possible worlds, the virtuous epistemic
agent is. The virtues help prepare us for the contingencies of consequential
or circumstantial luck in life.
1.5. Agency and Self-Awareness
The subject of the intellectual and moral virtues is the person in
whom knowing and acting are integrated. A faculty is not an isolated unit
in the body but works under the behest of a CEO (the agent) upon whom
all else depends and to whom all else is subordinated. Our operations de-
pend upon a power to be able to so operate, and these powers or faculties
in their turn are co-ordinated in the human being by some principle that
allows us to have a personal identity. It is more properly said to be Smith
who talks behind your back and not his vocal chords, or García who knows
about football and not his eyes and legs. Zagzebski defines action and
agency as follows,
«An agent is the kind of being that acts. To act is to exert power
and, at least typically, to bring about a certain kind of effect through the
exercise of that power. [...] In the strict sense only conscious beings have
powers. [...] If event causation is to be distinguished from agent causation,
that is because it is maintained that the cause of an act is not an event, not
even the event of an agent’s performing the act; it is the agent herself»127.
An effective epistemic agent has a high proportion of success in rea-
ching truth and in avoiding falsehood, but unlike general reliabilism, this
success is to their own credit and not to something else128. A study of the
counterfactual conditionals can prove illuminating for an analysis of the
causal relation, and of power, responsibility and even knowledge, since it
allows us to consider what the agent would do under different circumstan-
ces129. In fact, non-determinists often promote the Principle of Alternate
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Possibilities as a condition for moral responsibility: a person is not respon-
sible for his act unless he could have done otherwise130. So-called Frankfurt
cases falsify this Principle of Alternate Possibilities. The standard Frankfurt
case runs as follows:
«Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is un-
willing to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises
White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a
mechanism into Jones’s brain that enables Black to monitor and to control
Jones’s neurological activity. If the activity in Jones’s brain indicates that
she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity ari-
ses, Black’s mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit
the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her
own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not
affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises,
Jones decides to kill White without any “help” from Black’s mechanism. In
the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for
her act. Nonetheless, she seems to be unable to do otherwise since if she had
attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black’s device»131.
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities must be waived but the case
does not constitute an argument for determinism132. The relevant counter-
factuals are not possibility conditions for the possession of a power. They
are a sign of something deeper, a sign of the presence of agency, and hence
a sign of responsibility133. But whether my belief be voluntary or not, the
acquisition of belief depends upon agency134. Zagzebski argues that agency
is a sufficient condition for knowledge even when the agent might not be a
reliable one (given evil demon scenarios or Frankfurt cases)135. On the ot-
her hand, reliability cannot make up for the absence of agency136. A parrot
might be a reliable mnemonic aid, but it does not know what it’s saying.
Indeed, even with cases of simple perception or of automatically formed
beliefs, we might argue that if Mary Jones were a responsible epistemic
agent (homicidal tendencies aside), she could have stopped to reflect upon
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a sudden change of mind. If every time she was on the point of deciding
not to kill White, she were to suddenly decide in favour of killing him, su-
rely she would seek to find a convincing explanation for that137. The Gre-
eks said as much in response to skeptical challenges about our sense per-
ception; it is thanks to the intellect that we realise that the appearance of
broken oars in the water can be deceiving.
«Perceptual beliefs are typically unimportant, and there is no great
need for reflective endorsement in many cases. But when the consequences
of believing them are serious, reflective endorsement is called for. [...] An
agent reflects about her beliefs from time to time, particularly when they
are either suspicious in their origin or of special importance. And this in-
cludes perceptual beliefs. True perceptual beliefs earn the believer episte-
mic credit when the agent exercises her agency over them at the level of re-
flective endorsement»138.
The difference made by the exercise of agency in a causal process
is that it means that my epistemic success is due to me139. Zagzebski men-
tions that the term «agent causation» was popularised by Roderick Chis-
holm, who traced the term back to Thomas Reid (although we can go back
still further to Aristotle)140. An understanding of causation presupposes an
understanding of active power, the which stems from a knowledge of our-
selves as rational and moral agents141. Zagzebski does not necessarily en-
dorse Reid’s standpoint but mentions him in order to focus epistemological
attention on the places of acts and agency in the acquisition of epistemic
states, responsible beliefs, and knowledge142.
«While knowledge and justification are often connected with cau-
sation in the contemporary literature, agent causation is rarely mentioned.
Although Aristotle and Aquinas referred to the “act of knowing”, nowa-
days knowing is more commonly construed as a state rather than as an act.
[...] The mind itself is now often viewed as a passive information processor
rather than as an active agent. This view has led to a shift in the prototype
of the act in modern philosophy. We no doubt find it curious that in Aqui-
nas the act par excellence is a mental act since in contemporary discussions
the prime example typically given of a basic act is the raising of one’s arm.
So these days when we think of an act we usually think either of an act of
will or of a willed bodily movement. Cognitive and perceptual acts only
make sense on this view if preceded by acts of the will. The broader Aristote-
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lian category of the voluntary and the even broader category of acts both vo-
luntary and non-voluntary have generally disappeared from discussion»143.
Zagzebski ponders over meta-epistemological issues that have ge-
nerally been left to gather dust. What, for instance, is the cause of our idea
of causation? Is it due to our self-knowledge as agents, or to the testimony
of nature? Are the objects of perception (or the sensations and impres-
sions) the real cause of our perception, or is it the epistemic agent who
brings about this effect?144 She says that the nature of the self also needs to
be broadened out from Kant’s «notoriously» narrow one145. Our primus
primi first order beliefs and desires are of as much concern as our second
order endorsements and acceptance, for we could hardly talk about an inte-
grated character or personal equilibrium in someone who does not identify
with many of his first order desires and beliefs146.
Analytical philosophy holds knowledge to be non-accidentally true
belief, and justification or warrant lies in whatever it is that converts true
belief into knowledge. Agency and agent causation is of importance to the
explication of knowledge so defined because the agent’s subsequent re-
flectiveness makes a belief her own at a second level in a way that non-
agents cannot. Epistemic credit is only gained by an agent when her
agency is operative —either in the initial acquisition of a belief or in her
subsequent second order acceptance of it147—. In Zagzebski’s Virtue Epis-
temology explication of knowledge, epistemic credit is a component of
knowledge precisely because it depends upon agency. Any causal explana-
tion that ignores agency in how someone arrived at a true belief will
simply fall short of providing a proper account of how beliefs are for-
med148.
1.6. «Weird» Virtues
Even though truth conduciveness or reliability is a necessary com-
ponent to intellectual virtue, it is not a sufficient one. Philosophical and
scientific investigation entails making many misses in order to get a few
hits. Creative people have intuitions which they later subject to rule follo-
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wing and procedure (to the canons of that science). «The knowledge-moti-
vated person will want to have the virtues of creativity to the extent that
she is able, and that gives us another reason why the motive to know inclu-
des more than the motive to follow procedures known to be reliable»149.
Creativity and originality would seem to be connected with something ot-
her than the desire for true beliefs. The intellectually virtuous are motiva-
ted by the search for knowledge, and not a simply objective truth, because
knowledge includes the human dimension of understanding. Creativity,
moreover, leads to the extension of human knowledge rather than to the
generation of higher proportions of true to false beliefs. Robert Audi says
that without intellectual curiosity and creativity we would not pursue the
truth as much as we do, and so would have less knowledge and less in-
sight150.
Creativity and originality are «weird» character traits because they
require one to break free of habitual moulds151. They are virtues without
apparent order. How are they to be acquired then? And what does that
mean for the definition of a virtue? Creativity and originality, the same as
caution and humility in following the traditions established by others, need
to be governed by prudence in order to rate as virtues. The ability to make a
pun or solve a cryptic crossword calls for a combination of intelligence,
study, and lateral thinking. A virtuously prudential mix of said combination
will depend to a large degree upon the circumstances of each one —whet-
her or not the person is an artist, the chairperson of the Federal Reserve, an
intellectual seeking to challenge conformist views, or an accountant—. I
argue that it may well be the case that the success of a creative performan-
ce depends upon previous creative ventures. Even if one concrete creative
venture bears little resemblance to another, the attitude of the person to be
creative, to think laterally, to be daring, is reinforced in each case.
1.7. Zagzebski-Type Virtue
From the above discussion we could sum up Linda Zagzebski’s ap-
proach to the moral and intellectual virtues as follows:
i. a virtue is an acquired excellence of the soul —«a quality we would
ascribe to a person if asked to describe her after her death»152—.
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ii. a virtue is acquired through a process of time and effort, of ha-
bituation, by the agent (though creativity may be an exception
to this process).
iii. virtue has an intrinsic value that is wanting in the skills.
iv. virtue has a motivation component. Something seen not only
by means of the end to which it aims, but also in reference to an
emotion disposition —a set of orientations toward the world
that emerge into action given the appropriate circumstances—
which is harder to name.
v. virtue has a reliability component. «A person does not have a
virtue unless she is reliable at bringing about the end that is the
aim of the motivational component of the virtue. [...] we are
impressed with moral success, not to the exclusion of an inte-
rest in people’s cares and efforts, but in addition to it»153.
Zagzebski gives us thus the following definition of a virtue: «a deep
and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic
motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in brin-
ging about that end»154.
Ordinary language would seem to focus only on the particular com-
ponents of a virtue: feelings, desires, motivations, or patterns of acting, but
not on a virtue as a whole. Does that mean that no general account of virtue
actually exists i.e. that virtues are of different kinds, as Aristotle maintai-
ned in his distinction of the moral from the intellectual virtues? Zagzebski
is not prepared to concede such without a fight155. Zagzebski believes her
definition to be broad enough to cover both the intellectual as well as the
moral virtues156. Both involve a combination of understanding some aspect
of the world and training of the feelings, are learned, and are voluntary.
2. KNOWLEDGE THROUGH DOXASTIC RESPONSIBILITY
Traditional approaches to belief justification in Analytical philo-
sophy have depended on deontological or consequentialist argumentation.
Virtue Epistemology says that the good qualities of a belief are due to
some special quality of the agent who formed that belief. Faculty Reliabi-
lists justify a belief according to the agent’s healthy cognitive faculties.
Virtue Responsibilists also justify the person for holding a good belief be-
cause she has been responsible (and thereby rational) in her investigation
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prior to forming that belief. Zagzebski’s believer-based (as opposed to be-
lief-based) normative theory places the foundational source of a belief’s
justification in what the practically virtuous person would characteristi-
cally do or believe. Her unease with the consequentialism of the Faculty
Reliabilists leads her to downplay the role of the faculties in her explica-
tion of virtue, however. As a result, Zagzebski’s theory of justification is
not as well able to handle Goldman’s and Greco’s objections about the jus-
tification of beliefs held by little children (or animals) whom, as yet, lack
virtue157.
In the analysis that follows, we will see how Zagzebski looks to re-
solve the internalist-externalist split in justification by providing us with
«deeper» agent-based grades of assessment for belief-justification rather
than focus simply upon the (deontological) rule-concordance or (externa-
list) reliability of the belief.
2.1. Grades in Deontic Concepts
«Justification» is a messy concept that seems to be carrying more
weight than it can handle, but that by no means entails that the internalist
aspects to knowledge can (or should) be done away with, reducing episte-
mic normativity to what is merely externally warranted158. By turning to
the deeper notion of «virtue» within an agent-based epistemology, not only
can we seek to avoid blame by identifying what is «right» or «permissi-
ble», as per a deontological regimen, but we can also seek to reach as high
a level of justification as we can159. Zagzebski recognises, therefore, that
there are degrees of justification, unlike Plantinga who argues in on-off
terms about beliefs and who reasons that if a belief is not wrong then it
must be right160. Right acts and justified beliefs should be subject to further
levels of evaluation.
«A crucial task for any pure virtue theory is the derivation of deon-
tic concepts such as that of duty and of a right act from the concept of a vir-
tue. [...] An important feature of my account of these concepts is that it is
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indeterminate with respect to either a pure virtue theory or the weak form
of virtue theory [...] but they need to be read differently [...] It is only wit-
hin [a pure virtue theory] that they are actually definitions»161.
The paradigm for evaluation is what a virtuous person would cha-
racteristically do or feel in the same circumstances.
«A right (permissible) act is an act a virtuous person might do in
like circumstances. That is, it is not the case that she characteristically
would not do it. A wrong act is an act a virtuous person characteristically
would not do in like circumstances. A moral duty is an act a virtuous per-
son characteristically would do in like circumstances»162.
Zagzebski believes that moral theory has a wider scope than it is gi-
ven credit for: «My aim is to show that the concept of the moral is too na-
rrow as commonly understood and that it ought to be extended to cover the
normative aspects of cognitive activities»163. Our external acts are not the
only objects of moral evaluation. How we think can also be subject to nor-
mative assessment. Following upon Scotus’ division of the acts164, a co-
rresponding treatment of beliefs may be given, with particular importance
being laid on the notion of epistemic duty:
velle choose believe
nolle refuse disbelieve
non velle not choose lack belief
The «justification» of a belief may be derived from moral proper-
ties hence. Beliefs are not thought of as acts, they are held to be cognitive
states, but they result from the operation of character traits of virtues and
vices. Zagzebski holds our beliefs to be just as indirectly voluntary as our
acts are when we get drunk or give in to passion165. At this point, however,
it would seem that what we are actually dealing with is an application of
morality to our intellectual endeavours, in which case the virtues under
discussion are actually moral virtues (Zagzebski would agree with me
here) and not intellectual ones (Zagzebski would disagree with me here).
«A justified belief, the counterpart of a right act, is what an intellec-
tually virtuous person might believe in like circumstances. It is not the case
that she characteristically would not believe it. An unjustified belief is a be-
lief an intellectually virtuous person characteristically would not believe in
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like circumstances. An epistemic duty is a belief an intellectually virtuous
person characteristically would believe in like circumstances»166.
We have an epistemic duty therefore, to believe when it is virtuous
to do so, to disbelieve when it is virtuous to do so, and to withhold belief
when it is virtuous to do so. And if there is no one propositional attitude a
virtuous person would adopt in the circumstances, then there is no related
epistemic duty hence167.
An intellectually virtuous person has a reliable understanding of the
world (follows the rules properly) and is motivated to acquire the neces-
sary skills of getting to the truth, just as a morally virtuous person seeks the
means needed to grade students fairly, or effectively comfort a bereaved
person. When someone forms the same belief that a practically wise per-
son would form, then that belief is justified. Justification does not extend
to guesswork or clairvoyance hence, because they lack the understanding
one needs to be virtuous. So too, justification may be obtained by a brain
in a vat, or hooked up to the virtual reality of Matrix, according to its moti-
ves and the habits it acquires from experience (which is something an ima-
ginary «adjustment» machine can’t make provision for).
The first and weakest level of deontological assessment is that of
justification or of having done the right thing. To be in the right is to be
justified, but one needs to be so for the right reasons in order to be praised
for doing so. Duty has more to do with avoiding blame, whereas virtue fo-
cuses on praiseworthiness. Virtue theory does not simply look to avoid
evil as act-based conflict resolution and deontological legalist moral bot-
tom lines do. It pursues the good. «What a virtuous person might do inclu-
des acts completely outside the moral realm, such as reading a book, [...]
But it would be going too far to say that a person has merited praise for
acting rightly in reading a book»168. Her point is that simply being right or
justified are weak concepts for the evaluation of an act or a belief, though
I must say in passing that I do not think it would be «going too far» to say
that a truly free human act —be it reading a book or catching the bus—
should lie outside the moral realm! Be that as it may, to read a book or
forgo an opportunity of acting generously (if not in violation of moral
duty) is a permissibly right act but not an especially praise-worthy one.
Praise is given to those who go beyond the call of duty when they exerci-
se a virtue.
A stronger level of evaluation of one’s acts and beliefs would incor-
porate the praiseworthy or blameworthy intention with which the act or be-
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lief was carried out or adopted. The concept of human flourishing allows
us to make gradations in moral acts from:
(a) virtue – chastity
(b) moral strength – continence
(c) moral weakness – incontinence
(d) vice – licentiousness
(e) the monstrous.
I would add that a parallel can be drawn for belief:
(a) embrace belief
(b) assent
(c) make exceptions
(d) incredulity
(e) fanatical loathing.
The difference between continence and chastity, or assent and embra-
ced belief illustrate the difference between being right and being virtuous169.
One must not only do the right thing, it has to «feel» like the right thing to do.
A third and even stronger evaluation may be brought to bear, howe-
ver, given that virtue is a success term, in the sense that someone does not
have a specific virtue unless she is reliably successful in bringing about its
aim (which is the aim of the motivation for Zagzebski)170. A virtuous act is
an extension of the right act in so far as it is successful in bringing about
the end of the virtue (due to the features of a virtuous motivation and the
necessary understanding). Despite the best of intentions, failure is a source
of moral luck which lies outside the agent’s control. In everyday life we
draw distinctions between the praise due to a successful act in comparison
to a merely good-intentioned act that has fallen wide of the mark171.
The strongest evaluation of all is when the end (both ultimate and
proximate) is reached due to the praiseworthy features of the act. The act is
good, then, in every way.
«An act is an act of virtue A just in case it arises from the motiva-
tional component of A, is something a person with virtue A would characte-
ristically do in the circumstances, and is successful in bringing about the
end of virtue A because of these features of the act»172.
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Both Kvanvig and Kornblith say that it is not clear that there is any
one understanding of a situation a virtuous person would have as opposed
to what they might have. There is no guarantee that an actual person would
believe the same thing for the same reasons as a hypothetical person. The
virtues of a specific individual cannot be judged in comparison to someone
else173. But Zagzebski is concerned about the dependence of a belief’s jus-
tification upon the dependence of the justification of the background be-
liefs.
«If p is believed on the basis of q but q is unjustified, p is unjusti-
fiable as well. So p might be the belief that a UFO has landed in my back-
yard, where q is a set of crazy beliefs about the ubiquity of UFOs and their
propensity for landing in the backyards of philosophers. But even if p
would be justified on the basis of q, surely p is unjustified»174.
The constraint of the understanding a virtuous person would have if
placed in the agent’s shoes does not imply a unique understanding175. It me-
ans that the practically wise person would eliminate any strange background
beliefs and would supplement for any common-sense beliefs that are lac-
king. Now if it turns out that an epistemic agent is so irrational that she lacks
most of the background beliefs that a practically wise person would have, it
can come as no surprise that the vast majority of her beliefs should turn out
to be unjustified. On the same count, we need to keep in mind the distinction
between having an epistemically permissible belief —shared by experts and
so justified— and a praiseworthy belief —where one is actually aware of ex-
pert opinion176—.
Kvanvig also argues that the notion of virtue in justification is itself
misplaced since the justification of a belief needs also to explain the prior
concept of the justification of a proposition i.e. that one have adequate evi-
dence as prior to the propriety of how one has based their belief on that
evidence. Virtue Epistemologists are then said to indulge in «doxasticism»
because they justify the proposition in terms of the justification of the be-
lief. Even if the order of dependence were to be reversed, such can’t be put
into practice because what a hypothetical virtuous person would believe
cannot be used as an adequate comparison for the actual person’s proposi-
tions177. Zagzebski rejects the claim by saying that the role of justification
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in contemporary epistemology is far too inflated. Kvanvig’s argument is
taken to actually be a point in favour of drastically reducing the scope of
justification from propositions and restricting it to belief instead178.
The definition of a justified belief in terms of intellectual virtues is
the point of connection between Zagzebski’s work and that of Goldman
and Sosa, although the latter do very little to investigate an intellectual vir-
tue itself but look rather to its effects in producing a high ratio of true be-
liefs over false ones179. Zagzebski’s own re-working of moral theory attri-
butes the goodness of an act to the goodness of the motivation with which
it is carried out. As such the Zagzebskian motive bears some resemblance
to the Kantian will because they are both good in themselves. A similar
virtue definition of justification could be elaborated, however, by taking
on board the teleological concerns of Sosa and the reliabilists. «I will not
attempt in this book to work out the way my project can be linked up with
Sosa’s or Goldman’s, but I see no reason to think it cannot be done»180. I
think that the articulation of how this can be done would be especially
fruitful and an initial sketch is made by me in the criticisms I make later on
about Zagzebski’s work.
2.2. Knowledge and Moral Justification
The traditional definition of knowledge as being a justified true be-
lief has been abandoned due to Gettier counterexamples and disagreement
over the term «justification» itself. As a Virtue Epistemologist, Linda Zag-
zebski works a Copernican revolution from the belief to the agent herself
and to her traits (intellectual and moral virtues) as the source of that be-
lief’s justification. The following definitions of knowledge incorporate
Zagzebski’s grades of deontological justification.
2.2.1. Knowledge through Acts of Virtue
That a belief be justified does not mean that it is actually true, rather it
contains a property that tends to lead us to the truth. Knowledge, however, is
a state where the truth has been reached. The question of justification hinges
on the truth arising out of certain properties of the belief itself, paralleling
what Zagzebski defined as being a virtuous act. «So an act of intellectual vir-
tue [...] must lead to the truth because of the operation of the virtue»181.
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180. Ibid., cfr. ibid., pp. 14-15.
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«An act is an act of intellectual virtue I just in case it arises from
the motivational component of I, is something a person with I would cha-
racteristically do in the circumstances, and is successful in leading to the
immediate end of I and to the truth because of the features of the act»182.
In order to get «knowledge», the investigator should be receptive to
new ideas and arguments opposed to her own (open-mindedness), exhaus-
tively investigate the evidence (thoroughness), and resist mere fashion or
peer pressure for its own sake (courage). «So each intellectual virtue has
an end that is unique to that virtue, but since every intellectual virtue arises
out of the general motivation for knowledge, an intellectual virtue also in-
cludes knowledge as its ultimate end»183. As the definition of an intellec-
tual virtue does not include the concept of knowledge, knowledge may
now be defined in terms of an intellectual virtue without circularity arising
therefrom. William Alston says that Zagzebski has been brilliant in hand-
ling Gettier problems therein. By requiring a true belief to be formed th-
rough the virtuous motivation, she closes the gap between what makes a
belief true and the way the true belief was actually formed184.
Zagzebski herself spells out three different approaches to knowled-
ge, according to the motive and the object185. In the first case both the mo-
tive and the object sought are good (a passion for truth). In the second case
the motive is awry (smugness or greed), and in the third case the object is
also bad (vengeful prying). Interestingly enough, in neither of these three
cases does one fail to obtain knowledge, «we do not yet have a case in
which a belief satisfies reliabilist conditions for knowledge but not inte-
llectual virtue conditions and yet is intuitively a case of knowledge»186. Her
own test for justification and knowledge only requires that the person do
what a virtuous person in their shoes would characteristically do.
«The definition requires that the knower be motivated out of a desi-
re for truth, but it does not require that the agent value the truth for its own
sake, nor does it require that the agent’s other motives be pure. Having
knowledge in my sense is compatible with having an ulterior motive such
as the desire for praise, money, or social status»187.
Fine for an intellectual virtue, but would such really count for a mo-
ral virtue that demands an integrated character? It would seem that, given
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186. Ibid., p. 318.
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that Zagzebski is reluctant to distinguish a trait from a virtue (as argued
earlier), she would allow for a person to possess one moral virtue in the ab-
sence of others. In the case of a greedy person, Zagzebski calls on the aut-
hority of Aristotle to say that this is so:
«In that case the knower may be like the Laconians, whom Aristo-
tle describes as being motivated to be virtuous for the sake of natural goods
like honor. It is interesting that Aristotle is willing to say that they are good
(agathos), but they are not noble (kalos)»188.
In her nosy-neighbour scenario she says that,
«Her desire to believe ill of someone is surely not a natural good or
any sort of good. But she may also be able to perform acts of intellectual
virtue for the same reason the medical researcher [driven by fame] can per-
form such acts. As long as the definition of intellectual virtue does not pre-
clude ulterior second-order motives (even bad second-order motives such
as envy or pride), she can perform acts of intellectual attentiveness, perse-
verance, etc. She must, of course, have the particular motives unique to
each of these virtues, but there is no reason to think that she lacks these mo-
tives. Her problem is the rationale for the motivations themselves»189.
The problem here concerns the possibility of possessing one moral
virtue —perseverance— without all the others. The traditional view is that
while an intellectual virtue like scientia may be exercised virtuously se-
cundum quid, regardless of the overall moral goodness of the act, for a moral
virtue like courage to be exercised virtuously, it must be exercised vir-
tuously simpliciter, as a good act in every respect. In other words, a coura-
geous but unjust act would be an exercise of the trait of courage and not
the virtue of courage. As Zagzebski believes that there is no inherent diffe-
rence between the intellectual and moral virtues neither does she believe
that one virtue should be defined as dependent upon the possession of the
others190. I think that this understanding of moral virtue arises, however,
more within the context of her own motivation-based account and not wit-
hin a teleological paradigm of moral virtue.
A foreseen objection to Zagzebski’s responsibilism concerns the
specific case of unreliability even where someone behaves responsibly.
Let us consider someone who acts virtuously by trusting in an expert when
dealing with a matter that was outside his own competence, and yet that
expert himself had formed his belief on weak evidence. Zagzebski says
that this case illustrates,
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«the importance of the social nexus of knowledge and the need to refine the
account of an act of intellectual virtue accordingly [...] To the extent that a
person relies for knowledge on somebody else, her resulting state is not
knowledge if that someone else does not also have knowledge»191.
To have faith in what one does not fully understand, on the basis of
reliable authority, counts as knowledge to the extent that such authority is
reliable. Those who constitute such authority have a moral responsibility
thus, because passing on what is not knowledge is a way of harming others
in our society. But does Zagzebski also mean that if the person did not get
knowledge when she trusted but was disappointed, her belief was morally
unjustified as a result of bad luck and not just epistemically so? If the inte-
llectual virtues are a subset of the moral virtues that conclusion is hard to
escape.
2.2.2. Knowledge as «Cognitive Contact»
Zagzebski defines knowledge as a state of cognitive contact with
reality arising from acts of intellectual virtue192. Restricting the definition
to more Cartesian terms (i.e. in terms of an individual state of belief), we
can alternatively say that knowledge is a state of belief arising from acts of
intellectual virtue193.
By describing knowledge as a state of cognitive contact that arises
from acts of intellectual virtue, Zagzebski has looked to define knowledge
in a rigorous but attainable way194. It is a definition that handles contempo-
rary concerns of the internalists and externalists, such as Gettier problems,
but which is not simply an ad hoc response to a given counter-example be-
cause it has all the theoretical power of a background virtue theory195.
Along with precision, she has sought to provide us with simplicity, elegan-
ce, conciseness, an explanation of the data, put to rest unanswered ques-
tions and be practically useful (as opposed to definitions like «non-acci-
dentally true belief» because one should be able to recognise when one has
knowledge, the same as when one has a good life or happiness)196.
Despite her close paralleling of ethical and epistemic concepts,
Zagzebski says that the concept of knowledge itself does not have an ethi-
cal counterpart197. «If there were an ethical counterpart to my definition of
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knowledge, it would satisfy the following schema: x is a state of y arising
out of acts of moral virtue»198. Unlike moral acts, knowledge is not the act
itself but is said to be, rather, the state that arises from the «intellectual»
act199.
Virtue theory is clearly superior to atomistic individual belief state
approaches when dealing with «high-grade» knowledge of understanding
and wisdom200, and can deal with justified belief and knowledge as well.
Someone who is cognitively integrated knows that she knows, is coherent,
and with phronesis can see the relative value of the truths she has. The
«low-grade» knowledge of perceptual or short-term memory beliefs may
be more certain but is of lesser cognitive value. That said, perceptual be-
liefs are said to be included in Zagzebski’s definition of knowledge becau-
se a virtuous act may be performed by someone who does not yet possess
the habit (is on the way there). Reliance on one’s memory and perceptual
beliefs, where there is no reason to think otherwise, is an act of intellectual
virtue. Zagzebski says she is broadening the notion of knowledge to the
mundane, hence, in a way that Plato did not deem worthy of philosophical
investigation201. The point that Zagzebski would like to make is that ratio-
nality (and not perceptual beliefs) should be the paradigm of human know-
ledge, because rationality is what makes us most specifically human.
3. CRITICISMS OF VIRTUE RESPONSIBILISM
Julia Driver is adamant in maintaining that the attraction of Zag-
zebski’s mixed account, which combines praise of an agent’s good moti-
ves with the intuition that systematic failure is bad, comes at a significant
theoretical price —the treatment of perception as a virtue and not as a ca-
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199. Robert Audi also concurs with Zagzebski in saying that our beliefs are not ac-
tions (cfr. Audi, R., «Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief», p. 86). As already pointed
out, there would seem to be a general lack of appreciation for immanent acts in Analyti-
cal philosophy.
200. Virtues that improve our insight and our ability to pick patterns.
201. She also says in passing that St Thomas excludes apprehension by the senses
from the realm of knowledge (cfr. VOM, p. 277), though what he actually said is that
sense knowledge involves the intellectual judgement of the mind’s conformity to rea-
lity. Aristotle and St Thomas refer to knowledge from the senses as a type of knowled-
ge, «Quaedam enim cognoscitiva virtus est actus organi corporalis, scilicet sensus. Et
ideo obiectum cuius libet sensitivae potentiae est forma prout in materia corporali exis-
tit. Et quia huiusmodi materia est individuationis principium, ideo omnis potentia sensi-
tivae partis est cognoscitiva particularium tantum» (St T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae,
I, q. 85, a. 1). They even deem it to be a necessary part of our knowing material indivi-
duals as individuals via the conversio ad phantasmata (cfr. ibid., q. 86, a. 1).
pacity—202. By the same token, Bonjour’s irresponsible clairvoyant need
not be deprived of «knowledge» if his beliefs are being formed by a simply
unrecognised faculty203. Virtue Responsibilists need to modify their episte-
mic theories in order to take into account those instances of knowledge
when responsibility is not at issue i.e. in those cases when the will and the
emotions do not intervene in the operation of a cognitive faculty. Even
Montmarquet himself recognises the distinction between epistemic virtues
that are motivated by truth (or other epistemic desideratum) and epistemic
«qualities (virtues and vices)» that are not subject to our direct control at
all204. Instead of trying to argue that an agent is somehow responsible when
screening out rare perceptual beliefs, I think that Zagzebski’s epistemic
theory of the virtues would benefit from the inclusion of epistemic facul-
ties and the recognition of a set of speculative intellectual virtues of con-
templation that are of a different species to the moral virtues that aid us in
our research and investigation.
3.1. Need for a Faculty-Basis to Virtuous Justification
According to Zagzebski’s motivation-based theory, knowledge can
only be attributed to animals and little children if they believe what a vir-
tuous agent might believe. But why should what an animal or a little child
believes coincide with what a virtuous person might believe? It seems to
me that there is some deeper ontological reason for this.
«[I]t may be true that someone with perceptual knowledge does
“something a person with virtue would do” in the circumstances. But now
that “something a person with virtue would do” will not be something the
virtuous person does qua virtuous person. In other words, Zagzebski-type
intellectual virtues will be doing no work in the resulting definition of
knowledge, and so knowledge will no longer be defined in terms of Zag-
zebski-type intellectual virtues»205.
If a child who is not yet in use of her reason can be justified in her
beliefs, this will be due to the involuntary but proper functioning of her
cognitive faculties. Computers or robots cannot be knowing agents becau-
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205. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», pro manuscripto, 2001, pp. 15-16.
se they have no faculty for understanding nor for any sort of immanent act
whatever206. We, on the other hand, have operative powers or faculties that
enable us to see, taste, think and love.
3.1.1. The Virtuous Use of Cognitive Faculties
Plantinga’s Proper Function theory defines knowledge in a way that
refers only to the person’s faculties and the environment for which those
faculties were designed. The implication is that parts of a person (eyesight,
memory, etc) are designed by God to hook up with parts of the environ-
ment, past or present. When they match correctly, the person gets know-
ledge. All of this can go on completely independently, however, of the per-
sons’ self-consciousness. Linda Zagzebski says that it is the person that
knows and so the faculties should not be examined in isolation from the
subject. It seems reasonable that the conditions for knowledge are condi-
tions that the person must satisfy, and not simply the person’s faculties.
Although Zagzebski speaks about the virtues, she does not seem to be par-
ticularly keen to speak about the faculties that are the ontological support
for the virtues i.e. where the virtues are the good habits of a particular po-
wer. In the conclusion of her Virtues of the Mind, however, she raises the
possibility of tweaking Plantinga’s definition of «faculties that function
properly» to «faculties that function in accordance with virtue»207.
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206. A computer which is great at processing large amounts of information in a
very short time, never getting tired or having a bad day, doesn’t understand what it’s
doing. Searle shows as much in the Chinese Room experiment. A machine has to work
on a purely empirical basis, intuiting from repeated patterns in such a way that it only
discriminates between what is a useful pattern and what is not, on the basis of its pro-
gram’s rules. Sorting the wheat from the chaff is an incredibly complex and mysterious
process in a world rich in variety. Without a common sense that coordinates all the in-
formation received, and a faculty for esteeming what is useful, any agent exposed to the
world would malfunction from information overload. Now legendary is the sense a
computer tried to make out of a Japanese proverb that «Time flies like an arrow». One
of the possibilities it contemplated was that of a previously unencountered species
known as Time flies, who as it happened, were really quite fond of arrows. A «learning»
robot is capable of literally any action, no matter how bizarre, depending upon the ef-
fects of an unforeseen variable. Animals, however, are quite good at sizing up a situa-
tion and deciding whether to hang around or to scamper. «Intelligence» is not just follo-
wing the rules, it is an analogical notion, applied in different ways to different
mammals. Locke may have erred in his decomponential understanding of abstraction,
but he was on track in saying that it differentiates us from the brutes. Social animals can
communicate and even follow human instructions with sufficient familiarity and invol-
vement. What makes «human» intelligence different is that we not only follow rules, as
animals and machines do, we understand them, we discuss them, and we even make
them up and publish them.
207. VOM, p. 323.
A fuller definition of knowledge would be able to accommodate
both Zagzebski’s virtues and Sosa’s faculties if it looked to how a person
knows according to his or her capacity to know. The first step in knowled-
ge is perception, but as we grow we become more perceptive. As a person
grows, so do her cognitive capacities, and our definition of knowledge ne-
eds to be flexible enough to recognise that. This calls for a distinction bet-
ween faculty-based situations of valid knowledge and virtue-based ones,
without splitting up the notion of knowledge itself. It means that our defi-
nition of knowledge (and justification) should be sensitive to the capacity
and limits of the knowing agent when we check to see if the cognitive po-
wers are being «properly» actualised.
S knows p if, and only if, S forms the belief p in an epistemically
virtuous way according to S’s cognitive faculties.
Building on Plantinga’s «moderate foundationalism» we can say
with Wood that, «[to] function cognitively in a proper way is to function in
a virtuous way»208. Since a virtue is a good habit of the faculty, what counts
as virtuous behaviour will depend upon the nature of the faculty in ques-
tion. Good sight is a product of use and nature, whereas being just and pru-
dent has a lot to do with one’s free choices.
A child is in no wise motivated to believe that there is a tree in front
of her. Where motivations do play some part in her beliefs they tend to
team up with an uncontrolled imagination about imaginary friends or
monsters under the bed. The different kinds of justifiable beliefs she may
form will be somewhat restricted by the fortuitousness of the match betwe-
en her environment and her senses. Quite obviously if she were sent in a
rocket to Alpha Centauri the majority of her beliefs would be invalid due
to the unsuitability of Alpha Centurai conditions for her faculties. Howe-
ver, as capacity increases, so does the scope for virtue and knowledge in-
crease because the agent is able to carry out different sorts of immanent
acts: reason to conclusions and achieve insight. An astronaut sent to Alpha
Centurai is capable of being more skeptical about her unaided perceptual
impressions and so could form many more positive epistemic beliefs.
Bigger children and adults who are able to use their power of rea-
son are capable of intellectual knowledge. The epistemic virtues that they
acquire are the intellectual ones of understanding, prudence and wisdom.
Nevertheless, back here in the Milky Way, it would be hard to see how we
could deny the status of knowledge to a child’s beliefs that «This is
mummy» and «That is a doggy». As her faculties develop, so she will be
able to channel her will and intellect towards a broader range of justifiable
beliefs along the lines of a «high church» view of virtue.
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3.1.2. Epistemic Normativity and the Faculties
The attraction of the naturalist explanation of epistemology wanes
when we consider that the ideal and universal mind really does make an in-
tentional cognitive contact with material reality. We see then that normati-
vity is no longer a question of blind impulse from physical organs (or Kan-
tian will). Reality is seen to have an intrinsic nature and finality that can be
grasped by our intellectual acts and virtues209. By capturing the physis and
telos of things in the world, the intellectual virtues help us to determine the
appropriate normative oughts that pertain to all fields of knowledge, inclu-
ding ethics. These virtues also self-referentially discover and determine the
appropriate epistemic oughts. The notion of a virtuous use of our faculties
precedes a normative notion of knowledge therefore. But the normative
notion of knowledge must be preceded by some non-normative notion of
understanding or insight. Says Robert Audi,
«The development of knowledge seems to precede that of episte-
mic virtue, and the concept of knowledge seems prior at least to the episte-
mic virtue concepts that are knowledge-entailing. Insight may be one of
these, at least if an insight cannot be false and cannot be constituted by a
merely justified true belief»210.
The question of the first step in our intellectual virtues (and insight
and thence to normative knowledge), can be resolved if we include the fa-
culties in our definition of knowledge. The «justification» of our founda-
tional true beliefs derives from our epistemic faculties. Zagzebski-type
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209. With the rational knowledge from our nous we know the physis or form of so-
mething; with rational habits like scientia we discover how a physis unfolds in time;
and, building upon the nous and scientia, we wisely discover the telos or fitting good
that something should tend towards. The mind reads the intellectual and essential con-
tent of different realities e.g. «plankton», and then reasons to its goal e.g. «plankton sup-
ports the food-chain in an eco-system». Failure to capture this order leads to unwise be-
haviour e.g. accelerating global warming: «the bounded waters should lift their bosoms
higher than the shores, and make a sop of all this solid globe» (W. SHAKESPEARE, «Troi-
lus and Cressida», Act I, Scene III, The Illustrated Stratford Shakespeare, Chancellor
Press, London 1993, p. 619). Now, logos not only deals with the rational, it also invol-
ves freedom of the will (boulesis). We are free, to a certain extent, in the habits that we
form through our cognitive actions, in our ability to see or work out the telos. If we act
well we come to a better understanding and, vice-versa, if we act sloppily or with a
jaundiced eye we culpably come to a poorer understanding. So far as our own lives are
concerned, the intellectual virtues allow us to better integrate past and present towards a
sought after future that is more of our choosing rather than by circumstance. With free-
dom, we knowingly choose a future goal, the telos to be tended towards, but we do not
make up the rules and consequences of that future, nor do we guarantee ourselves of its
accomplishment. Our intellectual habits help point the way to where we should go, and
through our moral virtues we set our faces in its direction.
210. R. AUDI, «Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief», p. 91.
acts of (ethical) virtue are not necessary, then, for all human knowledge.
We need not speak of the intellectual virtues as faculties or skills. They are
not. But neither are they moral virtues. Insofar as someone has exercised
their cognitive faculties correctly (with the corresponding intellectual ha-
bits that have been formed as a result), they will ascertain truth or reality as
an essential consequence211.
The moral traits of paying attention, being courageous, etc, help
one in the exercise of their cognitive faculties. But, says Greco,
«the accounts of intellectual virtue defended by Zagzebski and
Montmarquet are ill suited to address either the nature of knowledge or the
dispute between foundationalism and coherentism over the structure of
knowledge. An account of the intellectual virtues modelled on Aristotle’s
account of the moral virtues is too strong for these purposes»212.
An idiot savant provides us with a special case where the degree of
attention required in order to carry out certain calculations is minimal.
Greco uses it as a counter-example to Zagzebski’s requirements by saying
that a mathematical genius who is not open-minded and fair can know
more than many others213. We cannot say that she does not have knowled-
ge; she simply acquires knowledge in some other way (with a more power-
ful faculty). Zagzebski acknowledges that the case is a challenging one,
but states that she is probably exercising an intellectual virtue in the case in
question, with the exception that it is quite an unusual sort of intellectual
virtue in whom is a rather unusual sort of person. At any rate, the idiot sa-
vant cannot be said to have knowledge if she can’t justify how she came to
possess it214. But is this not a confusion of insight with justified belief? If
we truly possess the objective truth in virtue of our properly functioning
cognitive faculties, surely this counts as objective knowledge —whether it
can be internally justified or not—. A witness to a crime has seen a crime
whether they can prove that in court or not. Says Greco,
«[Zagzebski’s] reply seems off the mark on two counts. First, not-
hing in Zagzebski’s account requires that one can explain, or give a des-
cription of, how one knows. Therefore, requiring the mathematical genius
to do so adds something new to the conditions for knowledge that Zagzebs-
ki has previously defended. Second, and more importantly, few people can
give an adequate account of how they come to have perceptual knowledge
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proper sensibles.
212. J. GRECO, «Virtues in Epistemology», p. 16.
213. Cfr. J. GRECO, «Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue», Philosophical and Pheno-
menological Research, 60 (2000) 182.
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—for example, that there is a table in the room—. And many people, inclu-
ding many epistemologists, get it all wrong when they try. But this does not
prevent people from having perceptual knowledge»215.
Zagzebski counts beliefs based on our memory or perception as vir-
tuous if they are what a virtuous person would also believe. I have no
qualms with that definition so long as intellectual virtue is understood as
the proper exercise of a cognitive faculty and not as a moral trait.
Perhaps it would be going over the top, then, to say that Zagzebski-
type acts of virtue are necessary for human knowledge. Since the road to vir-
tue begins with the first step, it is not necessary that a person actually pos-
sess the virtue in order to perform an action that a virtuous person would
characteristically so do. But then how are we to discriminate between those
that are on the way to virtue and those that have performed the action by
chance or in a fleeting way? Zagzebski looks to rule out the case of fleeting
processes by having recourse to the motivation with which one has acted216.
But that does not put paid to Greco’s objection that the requirement that an
agent be herself reliable, and not just an imitator of a reliable person, unrea-
sonably restricts knowledge to those who are already virtuous217. Robert
Audi says that it is one thing to argue that the instability of the basis to one’s
belief can undermine its justification, and quite another to say that this me-
ans justification requires the enduring and stable basis of epistemic virtue218.
«It seems to me, indeed, that there is less difficulty —even if not
ultimate success— in explicating epistemic virtue as a kind of trait that
yields justified beliefs and, in some cases, knowledge, than in explicating
justified beliefs or knowledge by appeal to an independent notion of virtue
and construing them as the kind of belief it tends to produce. [...]
»The possibility of explicating epistemic virtue in terms of non-
aretaic standards of justification and knowledge does not imply the reduci-
bility of virtue concepts to other kinds, such as rule concepts. That rigor
and insightfulness and logicality, for instance, can be explicated by appeal
to such notions as enduring success in forming justified beliefs, and acqui-
ring knowledge, in response to certain kinds of grounds does not entail that
this is all there is to those virtue notions. Virtue concepts have a certain
descriptive autonomy. [...]
»The notion of epistemic virtue can, then, serve as a basis for deve-
loping illuminating necessary and sufficient conditions for justified belief
and knowledge, even if these concepts are not analyzed by appeal to it as
the more basic notion»219.
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The answer is, I have set out above, an inclusion of the role that our
epistemic faculties play in the obtainment of understanding, insight, and
knowledge. Unlike the moral virtues which require the use of freedom, the
intellectual virtues begin to be formed in the womb as soon as our episte-
mic faculties become operative. Pace Zagzebski, the moral virtues can
very well aid somebody in the exercise of gathering knowledge (being
conscientious, paying attention in class, etc), but the «spontaneity» of the
knowing act itself pertains to the cognitive order and not to the volitional
order of the will i.e. the cognitive faculties are determined in their activity
and are not free220. Freedom is attributed to the human agent herself, and
not to the cognitive faculties which she possesses. It is the agent who is
subsequently free to direct her thoughts and focus on this thing and not
another (and so exercise an indirect control over her knowledge)221.
3.1.3. Social Justification
Is a Zagzebski-type act of virtue at least sufficient, then, for know-
ledge? I think so. But the normative considerations involved cannot be
identified with ethical ones. This is more clearly seen from Zagzebski’s so-
cial viewpoint. Let us consider the case of an intellectually vicious indivi-
dual in a virtuous epistemic environment; could we still praise the agent by
covering his intellectual (moral) fault with a virtuous social blanket?
Imagine the existence of a lazy speculator who spent all his univer-
sity years surfing but got the job because he is the nephew of one of the
brokering firm’s directors. The only thing he remembers from the photoco-
pies he made of his classmates’ notes is something about the efficient mar-
ket hypothesis, which states that systematic patterns that emerge in the
stock-market —close high on Friday, open low on Monday— are quickly
discovered, exploited, and thereby destroyed. As relevant company infor-
mation is assimilated in a matter of seconds, the only way of beating a
market average index is to turn to insider trading. But he is too lazy to co-
ver his tracks in insider trading, so he simply directs all investments into
indexed funds. His method of gaining knowledge is intellectually sloppy
but reliable and motivated.
Here we have a reliable process that does not seem to be the result
of intellectual virtue, not even in the self-interested sense of the speculator
who studies company fundamentals, since he hasn’t expended any effort at
all. Following Zagzebski’s line of argument, however, I think that we
could argue that where it counts he has actually acted virtuously by trus-
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ting in the right people rather than take a strawpoll at the donut diner or en-
trust his investment decisions to a blind-folded monkey throwing darts at
the company listing (though more than one wag could argue that it is an
empirically reliable method). But the individual who places his trust in re-
liable authority in an intellectually virtuous manner may still be morally
flawed in doing so, because the lazy stockbroker unjustly free-rides on the
intellectually virtuous acts performed by the Harvard graduates.
3.2. Intellectual Virtues are not Moral Virtues
Amelie Rorty takes Zagzebski to task over the subsumption of the
intellectual virtues under the moral virtues. Even if character and cognitive
traits can go hand in hand in an intellectually virtuous believer —someone
who is persevering, honest, able to work in a group or independently—
there is no ready correlation between a passion for truth and the talent for
discovering it222. Zagzebski, however, did not claim that virtuous motiva-
tion was sufficient for virtue. The passion for truth is only one of the com-
ponents of her intellectual virtues, which must also be accompanied by the
component of reliable success223. The question at hand, though, is whether
intellectual virtues require a motivational component as do the moral ones.
3.2.1. Virtue «Secundum Quid»
In Montmarquet’s «intellectual virtue as a moral virtue» case, truth
is restricted to the category of a good to be pursued, without consideration
of its universal, immanent and intentional nature in the intellect, held ac-
cording to the nature of its intellectual possessor224. Truth is subsumed,
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222. Cfr. A. RORTY, «Distinctive Measures of Epistemic Evaluation: Character as
the Configuration of Traits», Philosophical and Phenomenological Research, 60 (2000)
205-206. Although her statement that «virtues are reliable habits tout court» (cfr. ibid.,
p. 204) would actually favour a subsumption of the intellectual virtues under the moral
ones (or vice-versa). Moreover, Rorty’s examples of sharp lawyers and greedy attorneys
would seem to parallel the case of the young student who seeks high marks and not the
truth which had already been dealt with by Zagzebski (but is not mentioned by Rorty).
Amelie even goes so far as to claim that an Aristotelian phronimos would lie or manipu-
late when it is appropriate to do so (ibid., p. 204), though Aristotle would never have
deemed any situation appropriate for an action that runs counter to our physis e.g. a lie
or manipulation.
223. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Responses», p. 217.
224. «[...] nam receptum est in recipiente per modum recipientis. dicendum est
ergo quod anima per intellectum cognoscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali
et necessaria» ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 84, a. 1, co.
then, under the practical intellect’s command to do one thing and avoid
another, without consideration of its first coming to be according to its
grasp by the sensory cognitive faculties and the purely speculative opera-
tions of the intellect. In point of fact, he does so because he is not dealing
with the intellectual virtues at all but with the moral virtues applied to inte-
llectual considerations225. He does not distinguish, then, between getting
knowledge and getting knowledge in a prudent fashion. Axtell picks up on
the need to better explicate the relation between responsibility and reliabi-
lity when he asks the virtue responsibilists how they are going to avoid the
need for drawing up two lists of virtues, one conducive to knowledge, and
one conducive to justification, without severing the truth connection226.
Let us consider a reliable belief-forming mechanism that is irres-
ponsible e.g. one which does not include the motivation to know (which is
a weakly internalist element). We might think of the student who acts in an
intellectually virtuous way, aware that such procedures will be truth con-
ducive, but who is motivated purely by the need for good marks in order to
get a good job and who couldn’t care less about the actual truth achieved
by her efforts. In fact, certain classes of vice can actually be reliable truth
conducive procedures on occasions! A vice can lead to the truth as its ob-
ject, and to what seems like a good outcome, in violation of the goodness
of a moral act, as the result of a twisted intention. If the motivation that
lead one to give alms was one of smugness then such act would not be
praiseworthy. So too, if the motivation that lead one to the truth were not
love of truth but rather one of envious prying, or of greedy speculation,
then the epistemic act would be morally irresponsible.
When the truth is useful for the sake of something else, we have a
case of mixed motives227. A greedy speculator who exercises the intellectual
virtues associated with interpreting company fundamentals, values those
virtues not because they are noble and splendid to have, but rather because
it «pays» to have them228. Indeed, even a nosy neighbour’s sleuthing efforts
may rate as acts of intellectual virtue, and so the truth that he has irrespon-
sibly attained can qualify as knowledge. Zagzebski’s dual-component the-
ory of virtue duly awards these instances with knowledge but distinguishes
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225. It is this criticism of responsibilism that most directly affects Zagzebski’s
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226. Cfr. G. AXTELL, «Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology», American Philosop-
hical Quarterly, 34 (1997) 18 (in advance: RVE).
227. Cfr. VOM, p. 316.
228. Cfr. ibid., p. 317. The ingratiating student can be said to have knowledge in
the same sense, but in the case of a nosy neighbour, not only do we lack nobility in the
motive, we actually strike perversion because her ulterior or second-order motive is not
a natural good —a good job— but rather something evil as she wants to find reasons to
think badly about someone.
between the different degrees of praiseworthiness according to the first-or-
der intentions for truth and the second-order ulterior motives.
It could be argued in defence of the responsibilists that moral faults
will not be truth reliable in the long-run: the snoop will often jump to con-
clusions, or the proud person cling to contradicted premises out of an inor-
dinate need to be right229. A student that is eager to please in exams will as
easily believe what is false, upon a change of teacher, so long as it leads to
a good mark, and so an intellectual vice is not reliable where the reliability
test is applied to a wide set of beliefs. Where the truth is not wanted for its
own sake, it will be substituted for, if something else can be used to satisfy
the primary motive. Somehow, somewhere along the line, proud, vain, and
nosy people will trip up due to their loss of the relative epistemic value of
different portions of the truth230.
Aside from asking just how long the long run needs to be, when the
truth is a necessary means to some other end, as in the case of the greedy
speculator, we have no reason to believe that a morally delinquent person
cannot also be virtuous secundum quid. Zagzebski’s nosy neighbour is just
such a morally vicious person who cultivates the intellectual virtues.
Alongside our nosy neighbour we could also take the cases of a greedy
speculator, a street-wise gangster or a lawyer engaged in sharp business
practice. The special insight they possess into the ways of the world is pro-
of sufficient that someone can be both smart and nasty at the same time. So
too, other morally flawed types can also exhibit certain morally good
traits, but they are always good secundum quid. A Nazi could be courage-
ous or a biased judge compassionate in over awarding compensation pay-
ments to the wrong party. How is an intellectual virtue treated any diffe-
rently from a moral virtue then?231.
Secundum quid, good intellectual and moral habits are treated the
same in Zagzebski’s motivation-based virtue theory because each moral
virtue stands alone without there being any intrinsic connection to justice.
Within an Aristotelian-Thomistic teleological-based virtue theory, simpli-
citer only the moral virtues are held to be good i.e. only the moral virtues
are «virtues» in sensu strictu. It is quite possible to have an intellectual ha-
bit secundum quid (other than prudence which is also a moral virtue) and
still work evil, whereas, through the personal integration implied by a vir-
tue, the possession of one moral virtue simpliciter automatically means the
possession of all of them.
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229. Cfr. ibid., p. 315.
230. Zagzebski argues that in the case of a voracious fact collector, he would epis-
temically fail insofar as he would not have an integrated doxastic structure being too fo-
cused on trivia and so not able to see the wood for the trees (cfr. ibid., p. 315).
231. Cfr. ibid., p. 139 & p. 158.
The reason St Thomas gives for Aristotle’s distinction between the
intellectual and moral virtues is that the intellectual virtues deal with uni-
versal principles and so, while someone can be correct about the general
principle, she can be waylaid by passion in the particulars: human actions
are always particular ones232. When the moral virtues, which perfect our
particular actions, are governed by prudence, such errors do not arise be-
cause prudence governs our particular human actions with regard to the
particular means to an end. There is no necessary link to the motivation
with which one has sought that truth. When the will is sovereign in ac-
tually making a practical choice motivation then counts. In order to be mo-
rally virtuous, a person must wish others well and seek to make that wish
reality in practice (which means cultivating the intellectual virtues too). An
intellectually virtuous person sees the theoretical need to cultivate the mo-
ral virtues but need not put that knowledge into practice.
3.2.2. The «Intentionaliter» Distinction
Although Aristotle dedicated greater attention to intellectual perfec-
tion ahead of the emotions, he did not ignore the affective side to virtue.
Not only does someone take pleasure in the exercise of virtue233, both infe-
rior and superior appetites are an expression of the unitary rational and
emotional tendency of an agent. If the intellectual virtues are distinguished
from the moral virtues, that will have more to do with the ontologically
different ways their respective ends are obtained rather than whether plea-
sure should accompany the working out of a maths problem or be absent
from a work of justice or charity.
Zagzebski’s «state» of knowledge is understood as the end of a pro-
cess and not as an immanent act of praxis teleia 234. If knowledge is just a
product of inquiry then that quite naturally leads her to a study of the moral
virtues insofar as they lead one to work well towards some end-product.
She fails, as a consequence, to make a distinction between those acts which
finally get knowledge, like understanding, and those which simply impro-
ve our chances of getting it or prepare us for its reception: by being open-
minded, paying attention, etc.
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232. «Cum virtus sit habitus quo perficimur ad bene agendum, [...] Sic igitur ad hoc
quod homo bene agat, requiritur quod non solum ratio sit bene disposita per habitum
virtutis intellectualis; sed etiam quod vis appetitiva sit bene disposita per habitum virtu-
tis moralis» (ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 58, a. 2). «Respondeo dicen-
dum quod aliae virtutes intellectuales sine virtute morali esse possunt; sed prudentia
sine virtute morali esse non potest. Cuius ratio est, quia prudentia est recta ratio agibi-
lium; non autem solum in universali, sed etiam in particulari, in quibus sunt actiones»
(ibid., q. 58, a. 5).
Although the objects of knowledge and desire are intentional and or-
dained to an end, they have different ways of being intentional235. Reason ma-
kes the end manifest, producing a formal object in so doing, whereas the will
inclines toward the end236. The immanent act of knowledge leads to a union
of act and object in the one same act. This is an intentionality of similitudo.
The act of desire, however, underlines the otherness of the inclination and the
object it seeks after. This is an intentionality of otherness. The Thomistic tra-
dition holds that the truth (verum) of something (ens) is captured by the inte-
llect in a speculative way and is known as good (bonum) for the person in a
practical use of the same intellect i.e. as fittingly worth going out and getting.
The intellect is regarded as sovereign in specifying what one should choose
since it pertains to the intellect to determine what reality actually is and not
what we might wish (boulesis) it to be237. As Zagzebski herself recognises, to
do good one has to know what is good and how (and when) to do it238.
Properly speaking, truth and falsity pertain to the mind, whereas
goodness and badness applies to real things themselves239. The will and the
intellect can be distinguished as separate oretic and noetic faculties, there-
fore, because the operation of the will ends in the real things themselves
(which are good or bad) whereas the operation of our understanding ends
in the mind (and the mind is the ground of the true and the false)240.
Even though it is commonly thought that we think first and that
then we act (usually with some form of sense information first), thinking
itself is but one sort of act, and our conscious thinking and acting is often
in such a jumble that it is not linearly separable into “now I think” and
“now I act”. Zagzebski says that, «[it] takes tremendous philosophical in-
genuity to devise a theory that separates these activities enough to permit a
division in normative theory between ethics and normative epistemology.
It is my position that this ingenuity is misplaced»241.
Now, Aristotle and Aquinas do not refer to conscious temporal steps
in our thinking and acting «processes» when they distinguish them. The
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233. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 8, 1099a.
234. Cfr. VOM, p. 272.
235. Cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, In I Sentiarum, 3, 4, 4, co. Also, J.F. SELLES, Conocer y
Amar, Estudio de los objetos y operaciones del entendimiento y de la voluntad según
Tomás de Aquino, Eunsa, Pamplona 1995, p. 121.
236. Cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, In II Sentiarum, 41, 1, 1, co. Also, J.F. SELLES, Conocer y
Amar..., p. 122.
237. Cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3. The intellect
«configures» the act.
238. Cfr. VOM, pp. 158-159. To be kind, for example, we need a knowledge of the
world so that we actually exercise charity with others instead of annoying them.
239. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, VI, 4, 1027b25-27.
240. Cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, De Veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7.
241. Ibid., p. 231.
distinctions that they make are ontological and refer to the fact that we
cannot love what we do not know —a possibility condition independent of
our conscious awareness of what we are knowing—. Aquinas says that the
good is a «motor» of the will, but the motive that leads to an act depends
causally upon a prior presentation to the will (or to Zagzebski’s «emotio-
nal» faculty) of the object that has already been presented to the intellect242.
It is «first» (ontologically speaking) known universally as true, and then
known as a particular good, under which aspect it is presented to the will.
The speculative or «contemplative» virtue of scientia in our understanding
deals with the ability to demonstrate what holds universally and necessa-
rily rather than simply counsel about the best course to take in the contin-
gent future. Let us suppose that we are interested in the contingent subject
matter of «Socrates sitting down» or in the «dictates of fashion» for purely
theoretical and not for use purposes. Prior to all the practical applications
of our reason we already have a theoretical apprehension of reality when
we use it as a guide to what we do243. In other words, our knowledge of
some truth under its aspect as something good or useful to have, is already
knowledge of the truth as such. Our plan of attack always involves some
idea of what it is that we want to achieve. Insofar as we make a scientific
(and purely noetic) study we form speculative or contemplative virtues
that help perfect an immanent act of coactualisation of the act of knowing
and the object known (formed in that act)244. When we use that knowledge
about contingent affairs in practical matters we form habits in operations
that depend upon the known object having already been actualised by the
speculative operations of the intellect245.
3.3. Emotional Motivation vs. Contemplation
Zagzebski is committed to a continued internalist presence in epis-
temology and seeks to retain the conscious knower in pride of place. Whe-
re naturalistic epistemologists want to make epistemology a field of psy-
chology (or engineering), Zagzebski wants to make it a branch of ethics246.
Virtue Epistemology is not naturalistic in the Quinean sense therefore, be-
cause it is not confined to purely biological explications. She says that it is
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245. Cfr. ibid., p. 13.
246. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Recovering Understanding», en M. STEUP (ed.), Know-
ledge, Truth, and Duty, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 235.
only «naturalistic» to the extent that Aristotelian ethics can be taken as na-
turalistic247.
Zagzebski points out that the naturalist approach may very well
yield excellent results about our knowledge of the physical world, but not
of knowledge as such248. Although aware of responsibilist concerns, natu-
ralists cannot properly find room for them in their world-view. An empiri-
cal study of the intellectual traits that surround the birth of great ideas is
something that we should warmly welcome, but the fundamental questions
about understanding or how we ought to seek after the truth show that em-
pirical studies are not the whole of epistemology249. In related issues regar-
ding the emotions and the nature of knowledge, however, she appears to be
too conciliatory with Quine’s naturalist point of view. Zagzebski says that
she does not want to go into the nature of the objects of knowledge250. But
this issue is too important to let pass by.
Linda Zagzebski has made an admirable attempt to make Virtue
Epistemology of broad appeal to contemporary epistemologists. It has
come at the price, however, of providing an ontological account of virtue
that is sufficiently thin enough to be open to materialist interpretations of
knowledge. Zagzebski does not specify whether her «cognitive contact
with reality» is via the mediation of concepts or whether it is some form of
anti-representationalist functionalism or what have you. Her abandonment
of a reality-based teleology (and her silence on immanent acts and inten-
tional forms) has naturalist ramifications for her theories of knowledge and
ethics that lead to a conflation between our concrete noetic psychological
acts and emotions and the universal noema contained within those acts.
This helps explain why she subsumes the intellectual virtues under the mo-
ral ones and her amazement at the Aristotelian division of the uses to
which the intellect is put,
«What is so striking about this distinction to the contemporary mind
is that it leaves out one of the most common uses of the intellect —gras-
ping the contingent—. Most of the virtues I have called intellectual virtues
govern precisely the employment of the intellect that Aquinas and Aristotle
overlook. [...] the lack of a set of virtues dealing with belief about contin-
gent matters is a serious omission from the point of view of a contemporary
investigation into the nature of intellectual virtue. [...] One thing that is sur-
prising about this passage [Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 5, 1140b12-20] is that
he has ignored opinions about contingent matters other than those concer-
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Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, p. 5.
248. Cfr. VOM, p. 335.
249. Cfr. ibid., p. 337.
250. Cfr. ibid., pp. 281-283.
ning what is to be done. But in addition, anyone familiar with the practice
of the natural sciences will probably be amazed at Aristotle’s claim that
opinions about the subject matter of mathematics and the natural sciences
(what he considers the necessary) are undistorted by desires and emo-
tions»251.
Zagzebski touches here upon the issue of how the emotions (and the
will) can influence the intellect. In order to respond to Zagzebski’s challen-
ge let us first examine Zagzebski’s resolution of the «value problem» in the
light of naturalist normativity, then the intentional nature of an emotion,
and finally the role that motivations should play in our intellectual lives.
3.3.1. Naturalist Normativity and the «Value Problem»
The naturalist point of view may either be epistemological —the
best methods of inquiry are those which are based upon the natural scien-
ces and not some super-scientific vantage point— or ontological —only
natural objects are real and «natural» is whatever the natural sciences say
they are—252. But then where do ethics and abstract notions like «ought»
come from when everything just simply «is»? To what do we owe the hu-
man consideration of what I do and what I might or might not do? The pa-
radox of naturalism lies in its self-referential failure as a theory about the
absence of theory. A riddle made all the more ridiculous when we consider
the moralising of many naturalists about how we ought to decide our onto-
logical commitments when they deny the existence of real duties as an
apodictic facet of the moral order253. The headache produced by naturalist
normativity is referred to in John Dewey’s The Reconstruction of Philo-
sophy. There he argues that the split between what we can do and what we
should do is the deepest problem of modern life.
«The problem of restoring integration and co-operation between
man’s beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about the
values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem
of modern life. It is the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from
that life»254.
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252. Cfr. J. DIETERLE, «Ockham’s Razor, Encounterability, and Ontological Natu-
ralism», Erkenntnis, 55 (2001) 62-63.
253. Cfr. ibid., p. 65.
254. J. DEWEY, «The Reconstruction of Philosophy», The Middle Works 1899-
1924, vol. 12, 1920, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville
1982, pp. 77-202. Text cited from Axtell, G., RIV, p. 502. The split between the ought
of reason and normativity and the can of the physical world is deeply rooted in our Wes-
The naturalist solution to the problem of value has been one of re-
ducing reason and normativity to simple bodily functions255. Most propo-
nents of reliable-process theories, for instance, have typically tried to develop
a naturalistic theory that strips justification of its normative implications256.
A naturalist in epistemology wants to be able to locate such things as know-
ledge, certainty, epistemic justification, and probability «in the world in the
way that tables, colours, genes, temperatures, and so on can be located in
the world»257. As seen in the case of Alvin I. Goldman, the naturalist tradi-
tion ties together the belief and truth conditions of knowledge in such a way
that only non-epistemic concepts are employed in their explication258.
«When we discern a shape or colour before us, we do so presumably
in terms of a distinctive impact that such a shape or colour has on us. We are
put systematically into a certain distinctive state X when we are appropria-
tely related, in good light, with our eyes open, etc., to the presence in our en-
vironment of that shape or colour. Such a state X thus comes to represent for
us the shape or colour in question, and we thus begin to grasp that shape or
colour. [...] What makes one’s distinctive state a state of thinking of spheri-
city rather than something else, is that it is a state tied by systematic causal
relations to the presence of sphericity in one’s normal environment»259.
The naturalist tradition describes knowledge as a merely natural
phenomenon that occurs in a wide range of subjects: children and adult hu-
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tern heritage and can be traced back to the late Middle Ages. Says Llano, «Modernism
views the harmony between physis and lógos —physis and praxis— as an anthropo-
morphic illusion of the pagans, in need of a more intelligible control in the ambit of re-
presentations. [...] Thus began a rationalism that enshrined man as a being that, with the
faculty of reason, can carry out his own activities free of nature. Man came to be sponta-
neous, shaping nature and, above all, himself. As Gerold Prauss has indicated, this led to
Rousseau defining man not as an animal rationale but rather as an animal liberum» (A.
LLANO, Enigma de la representación, p. 77, my translation).
255. Naturalist solutions were already being propounded in Descartes’ time as al-
ternatives to his own dualism. Gassendi, for instance, could not envision how it could be
possible for the heterogeneous substance of the spirit (or logos) to connect with, and so
influence, the body (or physis). Descartes’ only way out was to say that the non-exten-
ded spirit joins with the extended body in the pineal gland. An Aristotelan solution is to
say that far from being heterogeneous substances, the spirit informs the body in all its
parts, life gives the body its unity as one sole substance. The soul is the body transitively
(cfr. A. LLANO, ibid., p. 116).
256. Cfr. G.S. PAPPAS, «Epistemology, History of», E. CRAIG (ed.), Routledge
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, vol. 3, Routledge, New York 1998, p. 380.
257. M. STEUP, «The Analysis of Knowledge», in Stanford Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy [online]. Available: http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/ stanford/entries/know-
ledge-analysis, [2001].
258. Cfr. ibid.
259. E. SOSA, «Introduction», Knowledge and Justification I, E. SOSA, (ed.), Dart-
mouth, Cambridge 1994, pp. xxvii-xxviii.
mans simply arrive at knowledge in ways that do not appear to involve any
reasoning whatever e.g. if someone should tell us that it was warm outside
two hours ago, our belief in their testimony is perfectly justifiable on the
basis that a reliable causal source for our knowledge is sufficient for justi-
fication260. Quine, thus, believed that traditional epistemology ought to be
replaced by a naturalised epistemology —hence the title Epistemology Na-
turalized (1969)—261 as a cognitive branch of psychology via an empirical
investigation into the ways that people form beliefs262. Goldman explains:
«It would be a scientific study of how the subject takes sensory sti-
mulations as input and delivers as output a theory of the three-dimensional
world. This formulation appears to eliminate the normative mission of
epistemology. In later writing, however, Quine has suggested that normati-
ve epistemology can be naturalised as a chapter of engineering: the techno-
logy of predicting experience, or sensory stimulations»263.
Contemporary evolutionary epistemology/psychology looks to ex-
plain away the humanities in general, and ethics in particular, as the result
of a natural selection of random processes whereby certain gene-types
blindly compete for continuation through their human carriers —even
completely self-sacrificing acts need to be seen in the wider context of the
common gene-type where one individual carrier sacrifices itself on behalf
of the other same gene-type carriers—264. Soldiers, for instance, are prepa-
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260. Cfr. P.D. KLEIN, «Epistemology», Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopaedia of
Philosophy Volume 3, Routledge, New York 1998, p. 363. I would point out, however,
that our trust in the testimony of others is not without an explanation. Knowing when to
trust in someone else is a matter of prudence.
261. W.V. QUINE, «Epistemology Naturalized», in Ontological Relativity and other
Essays, Columbia University Press, New York 1969, pp. 69-90.
262. Cfr. R. FELDMAN, «Epistemology and Ethics», E. CRAIG (ed.), Routledge
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy Volume 3, Routledge, New York 1998, p. 367.
263. A.I. GOLDMAN, «Naturalistic Epistemology», The Cambridge Dictionary of
Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, New York 21999, p. 598.
264. F. WRITES HEYLIGHEN, in «Epistemology, introduction», Principia Cyberneti-
ca Web, [online] Available: http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ EPISTEMI.html [Sept 1993]
(last checked: 2001, Dec 24): «A most recent, and perhaps most radical approach, ex-
tends this evolutionary view in order to make knowledge actively pursue goals of its
own. This approach, which as yet has not had the time to develop a proper epistemo-
logy, may be called memetics. It notes that knowledge can be transmitted from one sub-
ject to another, and thereby loses its dependence on any single individual. A piece of
knowledge that can be transmitted or replicated in such a way is called a “meme”. The
death of an individual carrying a certain meme now no longer implies the elimination of
that piece of knowledge, as evolutionary epistemology would assume. As long as a
meme spreads more quickly to new carriers, than that its carriers die, the meme will pro-
liferate, even though the knowledge it induces in any individual carrier may be wholly
inadequate and even dangerous to survival. In this view a piece of knowledge may be
successful (in the sense that it is common or has many carriers) even though its predic-
red to lay down their lives for their family or country in protection of their
gene-type, although cases like Mother Theresa would seem to be the ou-
tliers that prove the rule of the blindness of natural selection. But the very
fact that we are now aware of what our gene or meme types have been dri-
ving at frees us from biology as destiny. That same freedom now distin-
guishes us from the rest of nature in kind and not just in degree!265. Reason
would seem to have gained some independence of the body.
The human being is, paradoxically, a cultural animal by nature.
Although all human infants express the innately determined behaviour of
crying, clutching, smiling, babbling and making eye-contact, the influence
of culture can override even the strongest instinctive impulses of reproduc-
tion and nutrition. The human species’ despecialisation to its environment
in both body and soul is explained by some as the result of an evolutionary
«defect» that has worked in our favour. The basic argument is that humans
are born too early, and are then bombarded by more perceptions than they
can handle i.e. receive more perceptions than they can put into immediate
pragmatic effect. A «space» is provided hence for culture, for the theoreti-
cal, and out of this hiatus we develop such ideas as God, the immortality of
the soul, and duty266.
Interest and guidance make room for a normative concept of justifi-
cation within a naturalist paradigm267. Although evidential justification
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tions may be totally wrong, as long as it is sufficiently “convincing” to new carriers.
Here we see a picture where even the subject of knowledge has lost his primacy, and
knowledge becomes a force of its own with proper goals and ways of developing itself.
That this is realistic can be illustrated by the many superstitions, fads, and irrational be-
liefs that have spread over the globe, sometimes with a frightening speed.
»Like social constructivism, memetics attracts the attention to communication and
social processes in the development of knowledge, but instead of seeing knowledge as
constructed by the social system, it rather sees social systems as constructed by know-
ledge processes. Indeed, a social group can be defined by the fact that all its members
share the same meme (Heylighen, 1992). Even the concept of “self”, that which distin-
guishes a person as an individual, can be considered as a piece of knowledge, construc-
ted through social processes (Harré, 19), and hence a result of memetic evolution. From
a constructivist approach, where knowledge is constructed by individuals or society, we
have moved to a memetic approach, which sees society and even individuality as bypro-
ducts constructed by an ongoing evolution of independent fragments of knowledge
competing for domination».
265. Matt Ridley is not warranted in his remarks that there is nothing unique about
uniqueness, as if human consicousness (which is not to be identified with the internal
sense of imagination) were comparable to an elephant’s trunk or a chimpanzee’s large
testicles (cfr. M. RIDLEY, «Re-reading Darwin», Prospect, Bristol August/September
2001, p. 76).
266. Cfr. W. PANNENBERG, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, translated by
O’Connell, M. J., T & T Clark Ltd, Edinburgh 1999; pp. 28-29 & 39.
267. Cfr. P.K. MOSER, «Epistemology», R. AUDI (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary
of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, New York 1995, p. 275.
boils down to simply meaning evidential support, the ability to give a cau-
sal explanation of something does not preclude a place for responsibility
(though it never really gives an ultimate justification for it). A reliabilist is
usually concerned about being justified, even where justification itself
does not yield the truth. Indeed, if an epistemic agent is worried about re-
liability it is usually because they are seeking to change epistemic beha-
viour i.e. reliability has a prescriptive value. How, though, is justification
possible as a normative guide in a non-moral world of facts and figures? A
good number of contemporary epistemologists would seem to have taken a
leaf out of Hume’s book and pursued an instrumental role for reason in our
lives. They place the truth at the service of our passions, and this is somet-
hing that can be done in a better or worse way. In other words, an objective
argument may be held over epistemic means, whatever someone’s ultima-
te goals might happen to be. Justification can be construed, then, according
to the utilitarian (and not deontological) criterion of the «epistemic good»
i.e. that process which maximises truth and minimises error268.
Pragmatists like Sosa argue that we desire the truth insofar as we
desire correct answers to the questions we are interested in and not simply
the truth «as such» i.e. not just any old truth269. This can be readily seen by
way of a negative example,
«Suppose you enter your dentist’s waiting room and find all the
magazines missing. Deprived of reading matter, you’re sure to doze off,
but you need no sleep. Are you then rationally bound to reach for the telep-
hone book in pursuit of truth? Were you not to do so, you would forfeit a
chance to pluck some desired goods within easy reach.
If random telephone numbers do not elicit a wide enough yawn,
consider a randomly selected cubic foot of the Sahara. Here is a trove of
facts, of the form grain x is so many millimeters in direction D from grain
y, than which few can be of less interest»270.
No one is interested in mere facts. We apply our brains, rather, to
the resolution of crosswords, religion, management problems, and wooing.
These are the pursuits of life that we are interested in. Truth simpliciter is
almost never a human end271. But Sosa tells us nothing about the peculia-
rity or perversity of the epistemic agent’s interests. Supposing that you ac-
tually were interested in knowing about the number of grains of sand?272.
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Virtue Epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York 2001, pp. 50-53.
270. Ibid., p. 49.
271. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Hot and Cold Irrationality», p. 21.
272. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good», p. 12.
There is little or perhaps even negative value in the knowledge of trivia or
what your neighbour has been getting up to273. The importance of virtue in
the field of knowledge is not restricted to the resolution of Gettier pro-
blems but also concerns the ethical dimension to research and belief for-
mation.
As we have already seen in Zagzebski’s solution to the «value pro-
blem», she seeks to establish an explicitly ethical space for our cognitive
practices by grounding them in her theory of virtuous motivation. I argue
that Zagzebski is in the right when she talks about matters that involve
some current or previous use of the will. I take issue however with the pu-
rely «emotional» nature of our motivations but that will be discussed in the
next section.
True beliefs, or correct answers, or what you will, are goods (from a
material point of view) that can be relative to other goods. St Thomas said
that after the intellect has presented the will with the truth about goods in
general, a true belief may itself be seen as one more good to be possessed,
in preference to other possible goods274. True beliefs need not be conditio-
ned on their usefulness in the obtainment of other things because some are
simply interesting. Most university courses on Latin American poetry or
Greek history would fall into that category. But, as with the concrete choi-
ce for one good over another, there is always an ethical dimension to it. I
might decide to twirl a globe around and study all the names of all the ca-
pital cities in Asia rather than go and mow the lawns or save my neighbour
from drowning. What I choose to do is clearly an ethical matter. Moreover,
the permissibility or praiseworthiness of these different acts will also de-
pend upon the epistemic permissibility or praiseworthiness of the beliefs
that I have formed275. Surely the decision to let my neighbour drown re-
flects some fairly vicious previous epistemic behaviour on my part to have
so lowly valued the dignity of another human being.
What role does the truth play, then, in our lives? If we spend so
much time at school doing maths problems it has little to do with the love
of algebra and more to do with an intellectual training. Ernest Sosa argues
that our ideal of truth is about forming reliable truth-conducive practices in
our perception, memory, and reasoning276. The value of these epistemic
virtues is not intrinsic, however; the value of having a good memory is pu-
rely instrumental. Zagzebski turns the tables on the standard JTB procedu-
re and asks not what it takes to convert true belief into knowledge but rat-
her what does it take to turn justified and virtuous belief practices into
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knowledge? The answer of course is truth277. So, the value of knowledge
will depend upon the value of the motivation with which it is sought and
the reliability of that motivation à la Zagzebski’s Motivation-Based virtue
theory. And now for the trump card. In contrast to Virtues of the Mind,
Zagzebski now makes the claim that the admirability of her once intrinsi-
cally good motivations of benevolence or truth-seeking depend, now, upon
the higher order «motivation» to have a good life i.e. a life of eudaimo-
nia 278.
«If knowing a proposition is more desirable than truly believing it,
it is because it is more desirable to believe in an admirable way. But I can
see no way to defend that without a general account of eudaimonia, or a
good life. I conclude that if knowledge is a state worthy of the sustained at-
tention it has received throughout the history of philosophy, it is because
its value goes well beyond the epistemic value of truth and it is intimately
connected to moral value and the other values of a good life. Epistemic va-
lue is not autonomous»279.
Fides et Ratio embraces the intrinsic worth of our epistemic virtues
because they make us better people280. But it also raises the discourse about
truth up from the pragmatic search for the means that satisfy our pleasure
to a quest for meaning in our lives. The discovery of the Truth is the goal
that lies behind all our endeavours to know more about reality because the
Truth is a sure guide to who we are and how we should live our lives in
consequence281.
3.3.2. The Cognitive Value of the Emotions
In a Humean world, our sentiments call and reason responds like a
lackey to our emotional behests. But in Linda Zagzebski’s motivation-ba-
sed Virtue Epistemology the self-same emotions are responsive to an edu-
cation in their own demands. Despite the evident circularity in a process
where trained emotions set their own standards for training, little has been
said against it. Nor has anyone in the Virtue Epistemology debate, for that
matter, taken a deeper look at the rationality of emotionally motivated choi-
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280. Cfr. JOHN PAUL II, Fides et Ratio. On the Relationship between Faith and Re-
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281. Cfr. ibid., nn. 1-3.
ces or the truth-value of motivated actions. I will breech that concern in the
next section. For now, however, let us address Zagzebski’s concern about
the need to combine feeling with thinking.
If the emotions were purely private mental events we would not be
able to talk about them with others (nor to ourselves). Nor can emotion be
merely a mental event, since that would involve our always knowing about
the emotions we have. We know when we are feeling blue, but how many
people are really aware that they are green with jealousy or puffed up with
pride?282. Gilbert Ryle dismissed the idea of an emotion as a Cartesian
«ghostly inner event», but that doesn’t mean that it is simply a behavioural
expression either283. For all the breakthroughs made in neuroscience over
the last few decades, neither an analysis of the brain’s composition, nor a
clinical study of behaviour, can provide us with an adequate explication of
emotion.
«Although behaviour and the social circumstances no doubt have
much to do with emotion, they alone cannot account for emotion. Beha-
viour counts as emotional expression just because it is the expression of so-
mething else, and the social circumstances do not define but only provide
the context for the emotion. [...] Feelings, physiology and behaviour, along
with the social circumstances, all fit into the portrait of emotion, but what,
nevertheless, seems missing is the emotion»284.
Zagzebski is quite right to recognise that the concept of an emotion
depends upon a certain sort of cognition or evaluation of reality (indepen-
dently of whether that cognition be correct or not). Take fear for example.
When I see a wasp on my arm you can tell I get scared because I turn wan
(a physically describable symptom), I shoo the wasp away from my arm
(a determined behavioural response), and from the above you rightfully
assume that I have thought the wasp to be dangerous (an evaluation)285.
My behaviour is not the emotion of fear itself but rather the criteria accor-
ding to which you concur with me when I say that I have just received a
nasty shock. Nor is my behaviour sufficient on its own for you to say that
I was scared. How would an AI robot know that my increased heartbeat
and perspiring brow indicated fear and not pleasure? Devoid of an empat-
hetic understanding of the context, the amount of information required by
a robot to make a proper evaluation of my emotions would seem to be co-
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284. Ibid.
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lossal286. The key element to my emotion of fear, however, has been my
appraisal of danger. The same goes for the other emotions. Love is «love»
only insofar as it is love of something or someone, and ditto hate287. Even
Freud’s «free-floating anxiety» has an object, albeit an unconscious
one288.
«Philosophers (following Aristotle and the scholastics) have come
to call the essential nature of what an emotion is about the “formal object”
of emotion, and more recent philosophers have come to call the fact that an
emotion is (and must be) about something its “intentionality”»289.
When someone takes my car without asking my permission I get
mad, and this madness tells me that the person who took my car has done
something wrong. I make a Zagzebskian «ground-level» moral judgement
and exclaim «that’s unjust!». The passions not only modify our judge-
ments, they also respond to a mode of judging and evaluating reality290.
The connection between our feelings, the object of those feelings, our or-
ganic transformations, and our behaviour, is a logical one, and not an «effi-
ciently» causal one as the emotivists would have it however291. Why
should it be «logical» that I get upset when I find out that my car has been
taken for a joyride or worrisome when I realise that my insurance doesn’t
cover that eventuality? Our feelings are not the object of a special inner fe-
eling; feelings are the way we gain sense knowledge about our tenden-
cies292. Properly speaking we don’t simply feel sad, sadness, rather, is the
aversion we feel about something bad. A girl grabs a boy’s hand and sque-
ezes it. The boy’s hand begins to tremble and go clammy. Is he in love?
Disgust? Fear? The relation that exists between the passions and organic
changes is a «formal» one in the sense that the object of the passion is what
specifies the type of emotion that one is feeling —hate, love, or fear— and
his nervous trembling is the «matter», as it were, of said passion. I think
that Linda Zagzebski’s concerns that we combine feelings with cognition
in our epistemic analysis might begin to be satisfied if we were to view
these emotions as one sole event with two different modes: a material one
and a formal one, not two separate events joined together by a relation of
efficient causality293.
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286. Dilating and narrowing pupils are clear signs of interest and distaste, but what
if I was wearing shades or closed my eyes?
287. Cfr. J.V. ARREGUI, J. CHOZA, Filosofía del hombre, p. 230.
288. Cfr. R.C. SOLOMON, «Nature of Emotions», p. 282.
289. Ibid., pp. 282-283.
290. Cfr. J.V. ARREGUI, J. CHOZA, Filosofía del hombre, p. 231.
291. Cfr. ibid.
292. Cfr. R.C. SOLOMON, «Nature of Emotions», p. 283.
293. Cfr. J.V. ARREGUI, J. CHOZA, Filosofía del hombre, p. 233.
«For Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, the emotions or passions
are our subjective perturbations or affections when we evaluate reality, and
our consequent desire or rejection of that adjudged reality. [...] Passion is
passive, then, insofar as it consists in attraction or repulsion, and so our fe-
elings are things that happen to us. They are active, however, insofar as
they are a felt tendency. The passions are specified by their object because
they arise out of our evaluation of reality. When we desire a good that is
difficult to get ahold of, our subjective attitude is one of hopefulness, when
we suffer some present evil then we are sad, etc. In this way, we can define
the emotions as evaluations of reality, or the awareness of the adequation
and harmony, or lack of such, between reality and our desires»294.
Emotion is a «joint-product», so to speak, of various faculties inter-
relating with each other. In this sense, Zagzebski is right to say that our ap-
petitive dispositions need to be considered as intrinsically tied up with our
cognitive evaluations within the locus of emotion. But the respective con-
tributions and operations of each faculty need to be distinguished. An emo-
tion may be a source of knowledge for the intellect, or aid or obstruct the
intellect’s task, but its formal object is an evaluation made by the intellect
that knows, and not the will that desires, nor the body that feels. Once the
intellect finally fixes its gaze over something it is not the will or emotions
that do the intellectual knowing. The objective content of a mathematical
or scientific judgement is not a question of feelings. When Aristotle or St
Thomas speak of contemplation, it leads the modern mind to think of
monks in a cloister, but that is not the only form of contemplation. It is the
vision of the intellect, and can as well be applied to a consideration of fas-
hion as to the biological study of molluscs. That the will and our feelings
can interfere with our mathematical judgements is by no means denied, nor
that they affect our concentration, but they do not play a role in the actual
grasping of the real (or logical) itself. The will wants and the body feels
but it is the intellect that envisions.
3.3.3. A Motivational Component to Intellectual Virtue?
The Responsibilist’s desideratum that an epistemic agent be cons-
cientious is held to be a necessary restriction on Sosa’s «teleological» ac-
count that classifies any truth-conducive procedure as an epistemic vir-
tue295. Responsibility not only makes the agent reliable, á la Greco, but it
also ensures that the belief has been deliberately produced by the acting
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agent and not a non-aware computer or what-have-you. The responsibilist
focus on good methods of inquiry overlooks the essential difference, ho-
wever, between putting oneself into a position to know and actually kno-
wing.
a) Knowing Unwanted Truths
Fairweather says that although he agrees that an agent’s motivatio-
nal state should be a relevant factor for the possession of an intellectual
virtue, Linda Zagzebski has not provided us with a direct argument that
links a proper motivational state to the satisfaction of the conditions for
knowledge and justification296. William Alston goes further and takes Zag-
zebski to issue over the role that motives play in her virtue theory of epis-
temology. She defines it as an emotion, but «Emotion is a wheel that isn’t
moving anything in the mechanism»297. While that is formally true, Zag-
zebski defines the motive as an emotion because psychology attributes an
important role to the emotions in ethics and so, by analogy, will probably
turn out to be important epistemically as well298. Alston goes on to lament
the lack of any concrete examples of beliefs that are sufficiently voluntary
for someone to be motivated to have one299. Zagzebski clarifies that a per-
son is motivated in their cognitive activity to be open-minded or fair in or-
der to get the truth and not towards any particular belief300. Moreover, what
counts as voluntary should not be confused with a clear-cut choice since
we can carry an indirect responsibility for such in the same way we do the
actions that follow from the character traits we have formed or emotions
that we guide301.
At the other extreme, we face the objection that we need to include
the faculties into a fuller Virtue Epistemology. Zagzebski’s motivation-ba-
sed theory would seem to make it too difficult to justify beliefs that are cle-
arly not voluntary —as with perceptual beliefs— because they lack moti-
vation. To say that a «presumption of truth» should count as an act of
virtue to cover these cases would be stretching the point as they do not ap-
pear to be «free and conscious acts»302. Zagzebski responds that perceptual
knowledge is not a purely passive affair since it involves mental activity
(although the ontological consequences of perception as a mental activity
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in humans is not discussed by her). She expands on what she means by that
by saying that perception is something that can be potentially questioned,
and people would do so in the relevant counterfactual circumstances303. I
would object that the circumstances in which we question our perceptual
beliefs are few and far between, and neither should little children be preclu-
ded from holding valid Milky Way perceptual beliefs on their own merits.
b) Distinguishing the Message from the Messenger
The muted role of reflective freedom in our perceptual beliefs does
not preclude a place for motivation in our intellectual lives. I think that Zag-
zebski is quite right in her affirmation that the influence of feeling on belief,
through our motivating emotions, need not be so defective as many modern
philosophers, with the exception of William James, have so regarded it. The
emotion of conviction, for instance, is not a cause of belief so much as a
part of the belief itself. It is a «sense of reality» akin to Hume’s «vivid im-
pression», a feeling state that distinguishes belief from mere thought. Mar-
keting banks on vividness in graphic perceptual images and the emotional
reactions to such in the formation of beliefs. Belief comes in degrees and it
is closely connected to affective states of wanting, hoping, and expecting or
believing. In Star Trek, Dr Spock embodies the «objective» belief former
who bases his judgements on the facts alone304. Yet fear or enthusiasm often
aids Captain Kirk in the acquisition of true beliefs because he is then more
attentive or possesses his beliefs more vividly. My proviso, however, is that
although Zagzebski is right to argue that feelings should not be dealt with as
separate from our beliefs, they still need to be clearly distinguished from the
objective truth content in the beliefs themselves. It is precisely the truth
which gives rise to the feeling of conviction.
Instead of conflating feelings and desires with knowledge and the
intellectual virtues needed for knowledge, we need to distinguish the uni-
versality of the objective and truthful content of our psychic acts from the
particularity of the psychic acts themselves, or the practical methods used
by our gene-types, in gaining such knowledge. Psychologism and evolu-
tionary cognitive theories are nothing new of course, and the criticisms
made by Husserl and Frege over a hundred years ago are just as valid to-
day as they were then.
Husserl the mathematician wrote that counting, summing and mul-
tiplying are psychic acts that occur in time, but the ideal species of those acts
1, 2, 3, etc, do not speak about individual facts nor of a localisation in time305.
336 RICHARD J. UMBERS
303. Cfr. L. ZAGZEBSKI, «Responses», p. 212.
304. Cfr. W.J. WOOD, Epistemology, pp. 175, 180, 187.
305. Cfr. E. HUSSERL, Logische Untersuchungen, Gesammelte Schriften 2, Meiner,
Hamburg 1992, n. 46 (cfr. nn. 41-51 for a general criticism of psychologism).
Acts of counting have a beginning and ending in time, numbers do not. The
number 5 is not my act of counting to 5, it is an abstracted form which is ne-
ver absorbed by any number of particular cases. When I undertake calcula-
tions about trillions the verifications made of the results are ideal and not
psychological representations. The sentiment of evidence or necessity may
be felt following upon a transformation of the ideal to some concrete case,
but where there is no truth as such, or intellectual insight into the truth, then
there is no evidence to be felt either. A purely logical law deals only with
universals e.g. the syllogistic forms of Barbara, Celarent, etc, do not have an
empirical extension. Relations of ideas, moreover, such as a + b = b + a are
theoretical truths in the first place which ground the practical usefulness of
such knowledge amongst matters of fact in the second place. Says Frege:
«A proposition may be thought, and again it may be true; let us ne-
ver confuse these two things. We must remind ourselves, it seems, that a
proposition no more ceases to be true when I cease to think of it than the
sun ceases to exist when I shut my eyes, Otherwise, in proving Pythagoras’
theorem we should be reduced to allowing for the phosphorus content of
the human brain; and astronomers would hesitate to draw any conclusions
about the distant past, for fear of being charged with anachronism —with
reckoning twice two as four regardless of the fact that our idea of number is
a product of evolution and has a history behind it—. It might be doubted
whether by that time it had progressed so far. How could they profess to
know the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 was already in existence in that remote
epoch? Might not the creatures then extant have held the proposition 2 x 2
= 5, from which the proposition 2 x 2 = 4 was only evolved later through a
process of natural selection in the struggle for existence? Why it might
even be that 2 x 2 = 4 itself is destined in the same way to develop into 2 x
2 = 3! Est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines! [...] If everything were
in a continual flux, and nothing maintained itself fixed for all time, there
would no longer be any possibility of getting to know anything about the
world and everything would be plunged in confusion. We suppose, it
would seem, that concepts sprout in the individual mind like leaves on a
tree, and we think to discover their nature by studying their birth: we seek
to define them psychologically, in terms of the nature of the human mind.
But this account makes everything subjective, and if we follow it through
to the end, does away with the truth»306.
c) Seeing is Believing
Though it is often said that we should hate the sin and love the sinner,
it is actually the sinner whom we hold responsible for her actions and not the
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action itself. Given that beliefs are formed through our actions —Aristotle
held contemplation of the truth to be the highest activity of all—307 it is hard
to see why a normative evaluation of duty or responsibility should not fall
primarily on the free actor. The tricky part to all the discussion going on bet-
ween faculty-reliabilists and effort-responsibilists, concerns how the facul-
ties of will and intellect are used and related to each other in the epistemic
agent. By delimiting the specific contributions of the will and intellect to our
beliefs, I think that we can successfully resolve a major point of conflict bet-
ween reliabilists and responsibilists.
St Thomas describes the interaction between our faculties of knowing
and willing in our particular actions as a constant interplay between them in
the following order (going from the most universal to the most particular and
concrete with greater room for error in the process of so doing)308:
Reason Will
Sight of the good Simple willing
The dictate of Synderesis Appetite
Consideration Consent
Judgement Choice and Decision
Command (A mandate to act) Execution of the act309.
Insofar as we are dealing with the free (voluntary) choice to employ
a cognitive faculty, we are clearly dealing with moral virtues. But in the
actual exercise of a cognitive faculty, and not just a preparation for its
exercise in the cases of paying attention or being open-minded, the will ef-
fectively has no role to play. As we are not infallible, to what do we owe
the phenomena of error then?
«In practical matters, error is possible because what we have is not
evidence but likelihood. That said, what is of even more importance, howe-
ver, is that the will, which is always governed by the subject, decides in
practical affairs, and that decision can be incorrect, precipitated. Since in
theory a decision is of less interest, the possibility of error will be less. The-
oretical error is not directly caused through knowing, but rather it is the
subject who is mistaken, because he takes for adequate and correct what in
fact is not so. [...] The act is not mistaken. Who is mistaken is oneself310,
»error is explained precisely by the plurality of the human intellect,
which allows for non-logical unions. To not stick to what has been strictly
known, be it due to presumption or other motives, voluntary or not, is illo-
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nos de Anuario Filosófico, Pamplona 2000, p. 65 (my translation).
gical; just as every objective disarticulation is illogical. The intellectual
operations adjust themselves to their objects; as there are various, each to
its own. This is the internal congruence of the intelligence. But a man may
force objective integrations which have not really been thought, but rather
conditioned by subjective factors, voluntary or affective, prejudices of dif-
ferent types, or ambitions not yet fulfilled, etc. These are incongruences,
which lie at the root of formal errors.
»To form an idea of being, even if it be a well established idea, is
an incongruence, if being is a first principle that is not ideal. To try and ex-
perience causality is incongruent»311.
Now, belief needs to be distinguished, then, into what is assented to
by the will (credere) and the rectitude of the will according to what has ac-
tually been grasped as an intellectual principle (intellegere)312. The episte-
mic agent integrates his wishes and his knowledge into the one-same act of
belief, but this does not imply «doxastic voluntarism»313 because the recti-
tude of the judgement depends upon its conformance (adequatio) to what
the speculative intellect has grasped314.
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311. J. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Teoría del conocimiento humano, Eunsa, Pamplona
1998, p. 154 (my translation).
312. Cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 56, a. 3.
313. RVE, p. 1.
314. I do not think that the application of the term «cognitive voluntarism» to St
Thomas’ epistemology is at all fortunate because it might be misconstrued as meaning
that the will plays a role in the formation of the intelligible content itself, contrary to
what St Thomas Aquinas himself had written: «Quantum ad determinationem (seu spe-
cificationem) actus, qui est ex parte objecti, intellectus movet voluntatem, sicut praesen-
tans ei objectum suum» (ST T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad. 3). The
discussion of «cognitive voluntarism» in VOM, p. 64, implicitly includes Aquinas wit-
hin that tradition, but Aquinas is not Descartes. Aside from the fact that the former is a
realist and the latter an idealist, St Thomas states quite clearly that the «movement» of
knowledge precedes that of the will given that what we desire is always either imagined
or known about in the first place (cfr. ST T. AQUINAS, In IV Sententiarum, d. 14, q. 1, a.
2, b, co; also, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 87, a. 4, co; In IV Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 2, a. 2,
co; Summa Contra Gentiles, 1.I, c. 75, n. 7; De Veritate, q. 5, a. 10, co; De Potentia, q.
2, a. 3, ad 6; De Malo, q. 3, a. 8, co; De Anima, q. 13, ad. 12; De Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 6, ad.
5; Quodlibetales, q. 2, a. 3, ad. 12; etc, etc). That the will depends upon the intellect can
be seen in the Summa Theologiae, I, q. 19, a. 1, co; see also In II Sententiarum, d. 24, q.
3, a. 3, ad. 1; Summa Contra Gentiles, 1.I, c. 2, n. 1; De Veritate, q. 10, a. 1, ad. 2; De
Potentia, q. 9, a. 9, co; De Malo, q. 16, a. 3, ad. 4; De Virtutibus, q. 1, a. 6, co; etc, etc).
From a dynamic point of view, however, the will transcends the intellect as the perfectio-
ning faculty of man as a whole (cfr. C. FABRO, L’Anima, Introduzione al problema
dell’uomo, Studium, Rome 1955, p. 132). The will has for its object the telos of man (the
good), which is the first principle of every act, «Omnis actus voluntatis procedit ab ali-
quo actu intellectus: aliquis tamen actus voluntatis est prior quam aliquis actus intellec-
tus; voluntas enim tendit in finalem actus intellectus qui est beatitudo» (Summa Theolo-
giae, I-II, q. 4, a. 4, ad. 2). In this way St Thomas overcomes the immanent circularity
encountered in Aristotle’s practical intellectualism i.e. where boúlesis (rational desire)
pertains to the logistiko (the logistical) (cfr. ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 9, 432b5).
The responsibilist concern of Linda Zagzebski and Montmarquet is
with the method of inquiry, rather than with the contemplation of truth it-
self315. I think that Zagzebski’s focus on the transitive acts of inquiry, rat-
her than on the immanent acts of contemplation, helps explain her and
Montmarquet’s identification of the intellectual virtues with those moral
virtues that facilitate getting knowledge.
3.4. Rational Choice
I think that Zagzebski is wrong to reduce our motivations, and by
default our intentions, to the purely emotional level. The Cartesian separa-
tion of mind and body treated belief as independent of non-cognitive sta-
tes, and that position is no longer popular in the philosophy of mind. Fine.
But Kant recognised two levels of knowledge, sensible and intellectual,
which are united in a single judgement through their subsumption under
the transcendental ego316. And sentiment, for Kant, is the capturing of an
empirical intuition which freely flows through all the soul’s faculties wit-
hout actually being subsumed under any particular intellectual category317.
With Aristotle, however, we can take a further step towards pairing belief
with desire. He not only relates sentiment or passion (páthos) to our empi-
rical sense data and intellectual knowledge, he also looked to a «higher
grade» relation between the intellect and the will (boulesis) which leads to
freedom. More specifically, he speaks of an aware inclination (órexis dia-
noetiké)318 which is the fruit of intellectual knowledge. When it follows the
deliberation of reason (in a practical capacity) it constitutes a free inclina-
tion (bouleutikè órexis)319. Each sentiment arises in the subject having alre-
ady apprehended something and is the subject’s response to that object’s
presentation.
The division of Aristotelian virtue into «thinking and feeling» is a
division made by Linda Zagzebski herself and not Aristotle, who speaks
rather of a division between the rational and non-rational320. Aristotle’s di-
vision makes allowance for the existence of a rational appetite in the ló-
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315. Cfr. VOM, p. 4, ft. 2.
316. Cfr. I. KANT, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B. 144 (cfr. I. KANT, Immanuel
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N.K. Smith, Macmillan Press Ltd, Lon-
don 1929).
317. His Kritik der Urteilskraft deals extensively with the topic. (cfr. I. KANT, Kri-
tik der Urteilskraft, Verlag von Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1977).
318. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea, I. BYWATER (ed.), Oxford University
Press, Oxford 1959, III, 6, 1139b5; p. 115.
319. Ibid., III, 3, 1113a11; p. 48.
320. Cfr. ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, II, 1, 1219b27-36 & 1220a5-13.
gos 321. St Thomas translated boúlesis as voluntas or «will»322, whereas Jo-
nathan Barnes translates it as «wish». As a result, what in the Thomistic
tradition would read as «the will is born from the rational» is translated by
Barnes as «for wish is found in the calculative part of the soul and desire
and passion in the irrational»323.
While it’s true that Aristotle was uncertain whether to attribute deci-
sion (imperium) to the intellect or to the will324, the Thomistic tradition dis-
tinguishes the voluntas ut natura or télesis (a necessary tendency in our natu-
re to the universal good) from the voluntas ut ratio or boúlesis (the
indifference of the will before any particular good)325. What this means, in
short, is that if the «thinking part commands», as Zagzebski puts it, the will
or boúlesis (which is born from said intellectual act) must follow it. But
whether any practical judgement of the intellect about a particular good is to
be the last one, and correspondingly followed into action, will depend upon
the choice of the will326. As already stated above, if the truth can be viewed
as a good, it is viewed as a particular good, and so the rational will is what
moves the intellect in the dynamic exercise of desiring a particular truth327.
In what way should we distinguish a rational wish from an emotio-
nal desire then? The will would seem to be a more remote, and yet more
profound, principle to our choices than the feelings that our closest to
them. At a phenomenological level it would make more sense to speak first
of motivations rather than about more distant intellectual suppositions
such as rational wills, or of external objects that «pull» our appetites to-
wards them. But I suspect that mere emotions will not provide us with a sa-
tisfactory explanation about decisions of the heart.
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321. «èn te to logistiko gàr è boúlesis gínetai» (ARISTOTLE, De Anima, III, 9,
432b5; cited in FABRO, L’anima, Introduzione al problema dell’uomo, p. 125).
322. Ibid.
323. ARISTOTLE, The Complete Works of Aristotle, p. 687.
324. «diò è órektikòs nous é proaíresis è órexis dianoetiké» (ARISTOTLE, Ethica Ni-
comachea, VI, 2, 1139b4-5; p. 115).
325. Cfr. ST. T. AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, III, q. 18, a. 3.
326. Cfr. ibid., I, q. 4, a. 4, ad 2.
327. Cfr. ibid., I-II, q. 9, a. 1, ad 3. If the motivation of an epistemic agent is not
concerned with knowledge for its own sake, but rather some practical end that calls for
intellectual know-how (as in chess), the value of the intellectual virtues would not be
confined to the epistemic realm but cross over, rather, into the moral one. The Thomis-
tic explanation given here of the interplay between the will and the intellect also helps
explain the relation between moral and intellectual virtues, each in its own domain.
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